


LAST PAPER

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.

12 October 1968



Jan 12
in Alsop R.A. 18/10
in Evans R.E. 19/10
in Daily News 18/10
pa Jan 28/10

Dear David,

Arab Refugees

The recently arrived Czechoslovak Ambassador, Miloslav Hruza, has referred in conversation with H.M. Ambassador to an American proposal he had heard of from an American Ambassador in about 1960. Briefly, the proposal was that Israel should declare her readiness to receive back Arab refugees on the understanding that not more than 50,000 would in practice return, and that the remainder would be compensated for their property. Unfortunately Ben Gurion had rejected the idea out of hand; he was prepared to accept 150,000 but not an open-ended commitment. The Czechoslovak Ambassador thought the present Israel Government might be more ready to accept.

2. You may think this is of interest in case it reflects the thinking of the bloc countries on the refugee question.

Yours sincerely
David

(A. E. Saunders)

LAST PAPER

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

- c.c. Washington
- UKMIS New York
- Amman
- Beirut
- Cairo
- Tel Aviv

E18/19

Arab/Israel

Mr. Shafei, the Councillor at U.A.R. Embassy, called to see me today. The visit was largely of a courtesy nature but the following points might be worth recording.

Mr. Shafei said that the U.A.R. was aware that Israel felt that the Arabs had not made their position clear on a number of points, in particular, certain statements in the so-called Khartoum Declaration. He thought this was slightly unfair since the Egyptians had gone to some pains to clarify their position on these points to Mr. Jarring.

I asked Mr. Shafei, en passant how long Mr. Riad was expecting to stay in New York. Mr. Shafei replied that Mr. Riad was expected to stay about 2 or 3 weeks unless there were any significant advances on the Middle East question when he would, of course, consider staying longer.

Mr. Shafei stated that he had read ^ma report from the U.A.R. Mission to the United Nations, ~~but~~ ^{for} Mr. Jarring had set a deadline of 31 October, on his activities. I said that I had heard of no such deadline and thought it unlikely. I emphasised our strong conviction that the continuation of the Jarring Mission represented the best hope of an advance towards an eventual settlement. Mr. Shafei agreed with this ~~sentiment~~.

(J. W. D. Gray)
North and East Africa Department
Room 75 FO.
3 October, 1968

Copies to:

Eastern Department ✓
U.N. Political Department

pc

Arab/Israel: Refugees from the June War

When Mr. Shafei, Counsellor at the U.A.R. Embassy called to see me today on an introductory visit, he said that he had been asked by the U.A.R. Foreign Ministry to raise this subject at a suitable opportunity. He emphasised that it was not a formal approach: I got the impression that Mr. Shafei did not expect us to take the approach too seriously. Mr. Shafei said that the Commission for Human Rights, at its 24th Session in March, 1968, had passed a resolution (No. 6) about the Arab refugees from the June war. Subsequently, a cable had been sent on 8 March to the Israel Foreign Ministry, which among other things requested an end of destruction of Arab houses in the occupied territories. At the International Conference of Human Rights in Tehran a resolution had been passed on Human Rights in occupied Arab territories. A recommendation in the terms of this resolution was to be put to the General Assembly asking that a committee be set up to investigate the problem. Again in March, this year, the Commission on Social Development at its 19th Session in New York, passed a resolution drawing attention to Paragraph 27 of the Universal Declaration on Social Development and asking that adequate compensation for loss of property be paid to refugees of the June War. In February of 1968 the Commission on the Status of Women at its 23rd Session, passed a resolution drawing attention to the status of women and children in countries and territories striving for independence.

Having recited off this formidable list, Mr. Shafei did not seem to be quite sure what he wanted us to do. But he asked me to pass on to the relative department of the Foreign Office the fact that U.A.R. Government understood that Her Majesty's Government had voted for all these resolutions (I said I did not know the answer to that one) and that it hoped that Her Majesty's Government would continue to support such statements. He also said that the U.A.R. had been pleased to see that Her Majesty's Government had voted in favour of the recent Security Council resolution on Civilian Populations: I pointed out that Lord Caradon had made clear in his explanation of vote that we had definite reservations about the wording of the resolution but felt that it would not have been right to vote against the resolution with such humanitarian objectives.

(J. W. D. Gray)
North and East Africa Department
Room 75 FO.
3 October, 1968

Copies to:
U.N. (Economic and Social) Department
U.N. (Political) Department
Eastern Department

Handwritten signatures and initials: J.W.D. Gray, Mr. Alton, Mr. Bell, RAB, KSM, Pa.

E18



Reference.....

21

Reg. Per for Refugee files
Emergency Unit, Council Dept. No 19/17
are looking into this.

Meanwhile we have been told that
MOA have available in Cyprus
650 tents, principally 4 man,
1600s rectangular type at about
£40 ea. and 20,000 blankets
at about 17/6 ea.

Tents are sold in Lebanon at £31 ea.
but we don't know how that compares.

Freight from Cyprus to Beirut
should be easily arranged: air
freight is v. expensive.


Dispatch of MOA will let us
know fuller details.

~~[Mr Sampson
MOA 2140]~~

DALY
per [Signature] x 758

Hayman
Wolfsport
Maps
MFO

Eastern Dept



Mr. Roberts

You asked me ~~why~~^{how} tents had been so quickly provided for the victims of the Iranian earthquake when you had been told a short-time ago that no tents were available for the Palestinian refugees.

2. I spoke to the department. Mr. Daly told me that he had also been surprised. When he approached the Ministry of Defence, earlier in the year, they had told him that there were no tents available, even in Cyprus. He will therefore be getting in touch with the Ministry of Defence now to say that you had noticed how quickly tents had been made available for Iran. We were trying to get more money for the Palestinian refugees and if we were successful we would probably want to ask the Ministry of Defence to supply tents and hoped that they would be available.

(H. J. Arbuthnott)

6 September, 1968

Thank you. Seen a
small addition of tents
on the W. Bank will help.
R
29/9/68

Refugee Statistics

Only refugees in unoccupied Jordan have been included as it is considered that those on the East bank of Jordan are not in any worse position than they were before the June War.

All figures are based on estimates of the Jordan government. UNRWA consider that although their estimates are usually lower, it is fruitless to debate these with the Jordan government as this would only lead to friction.

UNRWA Registered 1948 refugees on E. Bank on 1 June 1967 ("old" refugees)	332,000
Displaced UNRWA refugees:	
from West Bank	140,000
" Gaza	33,000
Government Registered non-UNRWA displaced persons	240,000
Total refugees	<u>745,000</u>

Food Situation

Rations are issued to some 600,000 refugees, but on the basis of 1,500 calories per day for three quarters of the year and an additional 100 calories per day in winter. These are meagre. (M.O.H. say that a normal European adult engaged in light physical work requires about 3,000 calories per day.) Although there have not been reports of extensive malnutrition, 1.2% of refugees children under 2 were severely underweight, 8.3 moderately so and 13.9% slightly so.

The cost of food to UNRWA, through voluntary organisations and the Jordan government, continues to rise, and the Emergency Fooding Programme of the F.A.O., which has provided emergency relief costing \$3.5 million (of which \$1.85 million relates to refugees in Jordan) may soon come to an end.

But despite the paucity of the rations issued by UNRWA it is obvious from the statistics given that the refugees supplement their rations by food they either buy or grow themselves, and consequently there is no immediate problem of starvation nor over malnutrition.

The Shelter Situation

The accommodation problems of the refugees, already difficult following the flight of immense

/numbers

numbers of refugees, estimated at over 200,000, who crossed the Jordan during or shortly after the Arab/Israel war of 1967, were further complicated last autumn, this spring (after the Karameh raid) and this summer (after renewed shelling and bombing in the Jordan Valley). As a result, the tented camps in the Jordan Valley which hold about 54,000 people (Ghor Nimrin Suneh, Karameh Extension, Ghor Kabad, Damia N. & S., Maad; and Ghor Wahadeueh), together with the old Karameh camp holding 23,000, were evacuated to higher ground. In addition to these 77,000 people the Jordan government considers that there are a further 33,000 refugees living in, or close by, the tented camps on the high ground. (The distribution is:

Bag'a Camp	34,000
Jerash "	10,000
Souf "	14,000
Na'eimeh "	14,000
Marga "	9,000
Zeizia "	4,000
	<hr/>
	85,000
Squatting near camps	25,000
	<hr/>
	110,000
	<hr/> <hr/>

At present these refugees live either in tents (many of which are flimsy, "beach"-type affairs as distinct from stout canvas models) or in the open. UNRWA had secured the permission of the Jordan Government to construct 14,000 temporary mobile structures of wood and asbestos but there is now some doubt as to whether permission for these buildings will be confirmed. (If UNRWA is not allowed to erect these more permanent structures (which would take about three to four months and cost \$2.1 million, most of which UNRWA hope to get from NEED and the World Council of Churches), the outlook for the refugees this winter is bleak.

In addition to the camp residents and the squatters nearby, it is estimated that 300,000 refugees are living in and around the towns of E. Jordan. Most (about 200,000) are concentrated in and about Amman. The American University, Beirut, is currently engaged in a survey of conditions of the non-UNRWA registered refugees in the Amman area and their findings will probably not be published until at least September, but it is known that although these people have

/managed

managed to survive so far, their continued ability to do so is diminishing as their funds dry up, and they already represent a dangerously unstable political and social threat to normal life in the towns.

Availability of Medical Supplies

In his draft Annual Report for the year to 30:6:68, the Commissioner-General says that UNRWA's aim has always been to provide Health Services at a level largely equivalent to those provided by the host government for their own populations. Thanks to generous contributions from many charitable organisations, governments, and individuals, the additional pressure on UNRWA's health services was contained within bounds, and although the services provided are not large, there were no epidemics during the year. But there is no room for complacency in this field and UNRWA has identified as one of its most pressing needs the maintenance of emergency medical services in the tented camps in the high ground of E. Jordan. The Agency also considers many of its health centres in the new camps set up during the last year to be quite unsuitable and is hoping to replace them when funds become available.

E 18/19

FOREIGN OFFICE,
London, S.W.1.

27 August, 1968.

19
Thank you for your letter DAP
of yesterday's date to Mr. Daly
(who is on leave this week). The
information about priority needs will
be most useful to us.

(A.C.D.S. MacRae)

Miss D.A. Fenfold,
Standing Conference of
British Organisations
for Aid to Refugees,
26 Bedford Square,
London, W.C.1.

E 18/19

Registry No.

Phone mark.

DRAFT

Letter

Type 1 + 3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

Miss D.A. Perford

From

Standing Conference of
British Organisations, Department
for Aid to Refugees.

Telephone No. & Ext.

26 Bedford Square,
London W.C.1.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Thank you for your letter
DAP of yesterday's date to Mr.
Daly (who is on leave this week).
about priority needs
This information will be most
useful to us.

Reference.....

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-7 APR 1970
W E 18/10

Mr. Alston

Mr. Moberly

[Handwritten initials and date 20/4]

UNRWA

Please see MacRae's letter, 1821/73/67 of 25 April, and the attached brief on UNRWA. (I started to draft comments when we received it, but they have remained incomplete until now)

2. This is a useful statement of the complex situation with which UNRWA is dealing and of the limits within which the Agency must manoeuvre. Most of the points are covered in IOC (67) 176 of 6 October 1967, but Mr. Reddaway's brief includes more material than was included in the Commissioner General's 1967 report (on which the IOC Brief was based) on (a) the factors which govern rectification of the ration rolls and (b) ~~the~~ progress in integration of refugees into their host societies.

3. Mr. Reddaway's material on (a) (pages 10-13) and on (b) (pages 20, 21, 23 and 24) may be useful if it is necessary to buttress the arguments already put forward in favour of an increased UK contribution to UNRWA in 1968.

Flag A
Flag B

4. I doubt if Mr. Reddaway's arguments (page 21) that the major contributor's should concentrate their support on the educational services and their reductions on the relief services, could justify our changing the line set out at paras 50-52 of Section 4 and para 88 of Section 5 of the IOC Brief on UNRWA.

5. Mr. Reddaway's final section (pages 29-33) on Compensation includes some ideas on which it might be well to clear our minds, since they might be relevant if progress towards a general Middle East settlement brought into the sphere of the possible a general settlement of the refugee problem.

6. The Israelis maintain that under Israel law, the refugees' ownership of property has been extinguished, and that the disposal of the property is now a matter of internal jurisdiction for Israel alone and that neither the refugees nor the United Nations have any right to interfere. At the same time, they have indicated that they are in principle prepared to pay compensation to the former owners in the context of a general settlement, provided the property of Jewish refugees from Arab countries were to be taken account of.

7. Meanwhile the Palestine Conciliation Commission has completed its task of identifying and evaluating the property which the refugees left behind and the General Assembly has more or less annually reaffirmed its Resolution of December 1948 which asserts that the refugees ought to be given the choice of returning to their homes or of receiving compensation if they chose not to return.

8. Some movement towards a general solution of the /refugee

refugee problem might provide an opportunity to get away from this linked choice which has been institutionalised by the General Assembly's annual Resolution, the underlying principle of which is that if a refugee were to renounce his rights of repatriation, he should be entitled as a quid pro quo to receive compensation. This is of course an unrealistic dichotomy, since no refugee who, in order to get compensation now, renounced his rights to repatriation, would forego the chance of repatriation if it occurred in the future or would dissociate himself from any movement which aimed at giving the refugees the chance of repatriation.

Many would
not wish to go
back if they
received
compensation
and were
properly settled.
J.M.

9. In the context of a move towards a general settlement, the Israelis might be persuaded that in view of the small number of Arabs likely to opt to live in Israel, they could afford to forego the renunciation of the refugees rights of repatriation and to pay, without such (anyway unreal) conditions, compensation which would for the most part be used to establish the refugees more securely in the host societies—which would in turn reduce their rootlessness, which is what makes them so dangerous to peace and stability in the area.

10. In this context it is perhaps worth recalling that when Mr. Eban met Mr. Thomson and senior officials on 23 February, he said that Israel wanted to find a way out of the impasse of the refugee problem. He indicated that Israel would be quite willing to contribute to some general rehabilitation and re-integration fund. The Americans had advised the Israelis that this would not be politically acceptable to the Arab host Governments.

Flag #1

Mr. Doherty
Mr. Davis

T. J. Rutter
(T. J. Rutter)
21 November, 1967.

You should see this very interesting paper on the work of UNRWA much of which is still relevant even though it was written before the war. I do not myself think that the proposal to abolish the link between compensation and repatriation is very realistic. In view of the massive

Jewish immigration into Israel since 1948, any eventual arrangements for compensation must be framed in such a way that assure the majority of refugees do not exercise their right to return. Otherwise, there is no chance that Israel could go along with the scheme proposed.

J. Crookery

1. ii

✓QA

Will you return to me in due course please.

NTA 20/2.

(1821/73/67)

UNCLASSIFIED



BRITISH EMBASSY,

BEIRUT

25 April, 1967

19

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 7 APR 1970
~~AE~~ E 18/19

Dear Moberly,

UNRWA : brief by Reddaway

I enclose a copy of a useful brief on UNRWA ('Commentary on Some Aspects of the Palastine Refugee Problem and of UNRWA's Operations'). This was prepared by John Reddaway for the benefit of Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative John Tunney, when they visited Beirut in December of last year, and provides an excellent summary of UNRWA's operations and problems. I am also sending a copy of it to Chancery in the UK Mission to the U.N. in New York.

Yours sincerely,

Christopher MacRae.

(A.C.D.S. MacRae)

J. C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

Commentary on Some Aspects
of the Palestine Refugee Problem
and of UNRWA's Operations.

1. Possible Solutions
2. A Hopeless Problem?
3. The Role of UNRWA
4. The Major Contributors
5. The Host Governments
6. A New Initiative?
7. Summary

Beirut

December, 1966.

(Note: This document is not for publication or attribution; but the material contained in it may be freely used).

Possible Solutions

Theoretically, there are four possible methods of solution:-

- (1) repatriation,
- (2) emigration overseas,
- (3) mass resettlement,
- (4) individual rehabilitation.

These are not mutually exclusive. A solution might partake of some or all methods.

Repatriation has not been possible owing to the opposition of Israel.

Emigration has been negligible owing to the lack of countries willing to open their doors to a large influx of Arab refugees and owing to the reluctance of the refugees to cut themselves off from the Arab World and from their hopes of returning to their homes.

Mass resettlement was tried but failed owing primarily to opposition of the refugees and the host governments. Even without this opposition, it is doubtful whether this method could have succeeded. The physical capacity of the host countries to provide land and water for massive schemes of resettlement seems to have been over-estimated in the early 1950s. And no convincing arguments were ever produced to show why the host countries should be expected to give priority to the resettlement of the refugees in preference to their own poor and landless citizens.

The International community has thus been left with individual rehabilitation as the only practicable and politically acceptable means of providing, not a solution, but at least a partial remedy of the problem. Rehabilitation on an individual or family basis has already taken place on a considerable scale and the rate of rehabilitation is accelerating.

In fact, individual rehabilitation, depending mainly on the effort and will to survive of the individual himself, has usually been at the

core of any success in coping with massive human problems such as that of the Palestinian Arabs. Plans and projects and resettlement schemes devised by external agencies have rarely solved refugee problems, though they may have contributed to a solution.

In promoting individual rehabilitation among the Palestine refugees, the aid supplied by the international community through UNRWA is important, but essentially subsidiary. Far and away the most important factor, as always, has been the energy and resourcefulness of the individuals concerned. Fortunately, the Palestinian Arabs are a people of unusual vigour and resilience. (The notion that they are lazily content to live on international charity is false).

The second most important factor in solving any refugee problem is the level of economic activity in the area where the individuals concerned are living and the rate at which opportunities of employment are being created.

It was these factors which solved the European refugee problem. Again, the aid supplied by the international community was important but essentially subsidiary. Unfortunately, the Palestine refugees cannot expect to benefit by the kind of "economic miracle" which transformed the lot of the European refugees. But they can expect a gradual improvement of their condition - provided that the economic growth and industrial development of the Arab World are not interrupted and provided that the young refugees are given education and training without which they cannot compete for jobs. They can then be relied upon to make good use of their opportunities.

This gradual improvement of the economic and social condition of the whole refugee community by means of the rehabilitation of individual refugees is a slow business and an untidy method of coping with the problem.

It is understandable that the governments which have borne the main burden of supporting the refugees for the past eighteen years should feel frustrated, even perhaps exasperated, at the apparent lack of progress. But the truth is that, within the limits imposed by the continuing political deadlock between Israel and the Arabs and beneath the surface of an apparently immobile state of affairs, much solid, quiet progress has been made. This progress would no doubt be more widely recognised were it not that Western opinion tends to assume that problems which are not susceptible of permanent, definitive solutions must ergo be stagnant or deteriorating. It is also unfortunately true that it is seldom possible to reflect adequately in published statistics a gradual, diffuse process of economic and social betterment effected by means of the rehabilitation of individuals.

A Hopeless Problem?

Assertions are sometimes made that the Palestine refugee problem is growing larger with the passage of time; that it is becoming more and more intractable; that UNRWA is engaged in an endless custodial operation which has the effect of perpetuating the problem; and hence that the aid given by the international community through UNRWA to the refugees has been so much wasted effort, time and money. It is necessary to define one's terms.

It is certainly true that, as a result of natural growth, the number of persons claiming to be refugees from Palestine is constantly growing and will continue to grow. The birth rate, in common with that of the Arab World in general, is high - about 42 per 1,000. The death rate is distorted and depressed by the concealment of deaths among families receiving rations. But the true rate may well be very low indeed. Demographically speaking, the Arab refugees are a very young population; half of the 1,300,000 refugees registered with UNRWA are 18 years old or less. In Israel, the Government reports a death rate of only 6.4 per 1,000 for the Arab community. (This happens to be the same as for the Jewish population also). Owing to the conditions in which the refugees are living, a somewhat higher death rate should no doubt be assumed. But the health of the refugees is in general good and an abnormally low death rate might well correspond with the facts, if they could be accurately ascertained. As a rough approximation, UNRWA has in the past assumed a net natural growth of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent (cf. 2.7 per cent which is the published figure in Egypt). It may well be that this understates the true rate.

If, however, the assertion that the problem is growing larger with the passage of time is to be taken as referring to the number of persons receiving rations (connoting dependence on external aid for the bare necessities of life), then the assertion is simply not true. In 1950, when

UNRWA took over from the voluntary agencies the responsibility of caring for the refugees, the number of ration recipients was 960,021. By 1954 the number had been reduced to 837,826 as a result of a partially effective census carried out by UNRWA and as a result of ~~the transfer of responsibility~~ from UNRWA to the Government of Israel for a group of 19,616 Palestinian Arabs who had lost their homes in the conflict of 1948 but who had not left the territory of Israel. From 1954 the number increased by a few thousands each year until 1963 when it reached a peak of 882,074. Since then, it has declined slowly and is now 861,122. Meanwhile, the total number of registered refugees has risen from 941,851 in 1954 to 1,317,749 in 1966. Thus the number of ration recipients has declined relatively to the total registered population.

It is true that, besides the 861,122 names on the ration rolls, there is now a huge backlog of 284,025 children registered on the waiting lists as being prima facie eligible for rations. For what these statistics are worth therefore (and they may substantially overstate the number actually in need), it is possible to argue that the problem has grown larger and worse with time. But, from a practical standpoint, the essence of the matter is that a community which is now 40 per cent larger than it was fifteen years ago is managing to support itself without any increase during this period in the external aid it receives in the form of donated foodstuffs. If it is remembered that, from the very beginning, the individual ration has represented only about two-thirds of the normal intake of food consumed by a poor person living in the Middle East, the facts suggest encouraging progress towards self-support rather than the reverse. (This is not to say, of course, that there is room for complacency over the abuses of the ration system and the need to ensure a more equitable distribution. But that is another matter which will be discussed later in this commentary).

On the political plane, it may well be true that the problem is growing more intractable with the passage of time. But the political aspects of the problem lie outside UNRWA's province of responsibility. It would be wrong to confuse the political deadlock with the economic and social condition of the refugees and then to make this confusion the basis for unduly pessimistic assertions about lack of progress on the economic and social plane.

In one sense, however, it is perfectly true to say that the problems with which UNRWA is concerned are growing larger with the passage of time. Although a limit has been effectively imposed on the provision of relief, UNRWA has felt compelled to try to continue keeping pace with the growth of the refugee population in regard to the provision of health and education services. The health services are simple and cheap, though effective, and UNRWA has not thought that it could humanely cut them back. On the education and training which are provided for the young refugees depends their future and, indeed, that of the whole refugee community. It would be perverse to reduce these services; indeed, from all standpoints, there are the strongest arguments for expanding and improving them.

Does this justify an assertion that UNRWA is engaged in "an endless custodial operation which has the effect of perpetuating the problem"? Certainly at the present time it is difficult to set a term on the need of the refugee community for continuing aid and support from some source external to itself. . Certainly also it is now clear that, in the fateful decisions which it took in 1947 and 1948, the international community involved itself in a long-term problem which is not likely to be resolved for many years still to come. In time, the need for relief ought to disappear as the older generation of refugees dies out, although the plight of the refugees in Gaza will remain a special problem until some means are found of moving the majority of them elsewhere. As for health and

education, the need for these services is permanent and they will have to be provided by some means or other, whatever may be the final outcome of the refugee problem. Ultimately a time must come when the refugees will pay for these services themselves as tax-paying members of the society in which they are finally re-established. But no-one with a true knowledge of the present condition of the refugees is likely to maintain that the bulk of them are yet able to finance for themselves the provision of these public services or are likely to be able to do so in the near future. Meanwhile, the better the provision that can be made for educating the young refugees the sooner will the refugee community be able to pay for the public services it needs.

The operation in which UNRWA is engaged is thus not endless, though it is certainly long-term. Nor can it properly be dismissed as a purely custodial or holding operation. Its role is in fact much more constructive than those terms imply. As for the suggestion that the continued existence and operation of UNRWA has the effect of perpetuating the problem, this implies that, if UNRWA were to disappear, then the Palestine refugee problem would disappear also. Surely what keeps this problem alive is a conflict of irreconcilable political aims, a burning grievance which time has not diminished and a degree of human misery which cannot soon or easily be assuaged.

Finally, to suggest that the aid given by the international community through UNRWA to the refugees has been so much wasted effort, time and money does much less than justice to those who have supported, as well as those who have served, the Palestine refugees in the long, unhappy years since they were uprooted from their homes. To be sure, the programme of United Nations assistance to these refugees has had its failures and its shortcomings; but it has also achieved much in which the international community can properly take pride and much which will bear comparison in efficiency and economy with similar programmes, both multilateral and bilateral, in the world.

/...

Whatever may be the faults in the distribution of foodstuffs, the fact is that a community of a million or so poor peasant folk uprooted from their homes, their land and their way of life, and given refuge in lands where there was no demand for the traditional skills which were the only equipment they possessed for supporting themselves - a community larger than the population of a number of member states of the United Nations - has been kept alive without starvation or even serious incidence of malnutrition for eighteen years past. But the rations have not merely kept the refugees alive to continue as a perpetual burden on the charity of their fellow men. The steady provision of these basic foodstuffs year after year has, perhaps fortuitously, served a constructive purpose in supplying a modest economic subvention to the refugees to help them in their hard, uphill struggle to recover their economic independence.

Under the shelter programme, 500,000 refugees have been housed. However, stark and simple, the huts in the UNRWA camps do serve to put a roof over the refugees' heads and to give them at least the nucleus of a home which they can improve and expand, as their means permit. Gradually the living conditions in the camps are being improved.

In the space of the sixteen years of UNRWA's operation there has been no major epidemic among the refugees, in spite of the conditions in which they have been living. A simple, cheap but effective community health service has been built up with technical guidance from WHO.

A whole education system has been developed from scratch with technical advice and guidance from Unesco; four hundred thousand children have received schooling; two hundred and sixty schools have been constructed of good but remarkably cheap design and Unesco have judged it worthwhile to prepare a special report on the design and construction of these schools for possible use elsewhere in developing countries; a notable and extremely promising experiment has been launched to provide in-service

training for unqualified or under-qualified teachers and this again may prove to be of great significance for educational development elsewhere in the world; the teaching of handicrafts to boys and of home economics to girls has received special attention in the UNRWA/Unesco school system; modern teaching methods have been introduced into the refugee schools; ten well-equipped centres have been established for training teachers and for training young refugee men and women in a variety of industrial and semi-professional skills; the development of the vocational training programme has been a true pioneering effort and has had the result that UNRWA is now one of the most important channels for this type of technical assistance at work in the Middle East; in particular, UNRWA has been an initiator and pioneer in the vocational training of young women; and in general it has given special attention to the education of girls so that the proportion of refugee girls attending school is now among the highest in the Arab World.

These are but some of the highlights of the constructive role which UNRWA has been playing, not merely as a refugee relief agency, but also as an instrument of technical assistance and development aid.

The Role of UNRWA

The label of "refugee relief" which is attached to UNRWA activities in general tends to obscure the constructive nature of most of its work and to confirm among people who do not have first-hand knowledge of the Agency's activities the assumption that UNRWA is engaged in merely a custodial operation serving no constructive purpose and contributing little, if at all, even to an amelioration of the problem.

All too often the one fact with which overseas observers seem to be familiar is that there are abuses in the distribution of rations. Although this is a serious and distressing problem, it does need to be kept in proportion. Programmes for the relief of mass indigence are nearly always plagued by abuses and, in encountering problems of this kind, UNRWA is certainly not alone among agencies operating in this field both on the international and on the national plane. Moreover, it needs to be recognised that the circumstances in which UNRWA operates are probably more than usually difficult.

The following considerations need to be kept in mind in order to reach a balanced judgment on the problem of the ration rolls:-

- (1) what is at issue is an allocation of dry foodstuffs costing \$1.20 a month for each refugee and representing 1,500/1,600 calories a day (or about two-thirds of the normal intake of food consumed by a poor person in the Middle East);
- (2) when people are living near the borderline of subsistence, it is understandable that they should not be overscrupulous in snatching what advantage they can from the arrangements made for alleviating their distress;
- (3) the refugees have a strong psychological attachment to their ration cards as evidence of their refugee status and of their claim to repatriation or compensation under the terms of the General Assembly's Resolution 194 (III);

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- (4) although the danger of explosive reactions among the refugees may sometimes be exaggerated in order to strengthen the case for not disturbing the status quo, there is no doubt that this is genuinely a highly sensitive issue for the host governments;
- (5) basically the problem is one of politics and public security, not a technical problem of administering relief; this is particularly true in Jordan where the worst abuses occur;
- (6) UNRWA operates in the host countries by consent of the host governments; no international agency in such a position would be justified in pursuing rectification of the ration rolls to a point where this endangered public security and involved defiance of warnings and requests to desist from the host government;
- (7) the limitations on UNRWA's capacity to take unilateral action in this respect have been recognised by the General Assembly whose resolutions on the subject couple a direction to UNRWA about ensuring equitable distribution with a direction that it should act in co-operation with the host governments;
- (8) UNRWA is not, never has been and never will be equipped to carry out widespread detailed investigations into the family circumstances of hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees; to do this thoroughly would require a host of investigators armed with powers to enter refugee homes and carry out a personal identification of all members of the family, including the womenfolk (which would be repugnant to Arab custom); it would also involve attempting to apply a means test to masses of uncooperative families living at a level and in circumstances where the whole concept of a regular, measurable income is inapplicable;
- (9) it is possible that some at least of the criticism stems from an understandable, but not wholly logical, impatience with the intractability of the whole Palestine refugee problem as symbolised by the continued distribution of rations to a vast number of persons so long

after the events which displaced them from their homes. Just as, for the refugees, the rations symbolise their continuing dependence on the international community and their still unsatisfied claim for redress of the wrong which they believe they have suffered at the hands of the international community, so in other quarters the rations symbolise what is considered to be a tiresome intransigence on the part of the refugees and the Arab governments in refusing to accept Israel as a fait accompli and in refusing to acquiesce in the reintegration of the refugees in the Arab World as the only practicable and humane solution of their problem. These political overtones confuse and complicate the apparently straightforward humanitarian task of distributing the rations according to need. On the one hand, there is pressure to maximise the number of persons in need of rations in order to prove that the refugees cannot be absorbed in the Arab World and must therefore be given the opportunity of returning to their homes. On the other, there is pressure to minimise the number in order to demonstrate that the refugees can be and are in fact being absorbed in the Arab World. This barren "numbers game" lends itself to exaggeration and overstatement on both sides.

Admitting then that these complicating considerations need to be kept in mind, what can be done to remedy abuses and ensure a more equitable distribution? There are really only two possible courses.

The first is to persuade the host governments to co-operate with the Agency in carrying out corrective action. The degree of co-operation actually achieved should not be underestimated. In the Lebanon and the Gaza Strip it is considerable and has produced fairly satisfactory results. It is also satisfactory in Syria in regard to the verification of births and deaths but not in regard to the assessment of need. Even in Jordan unobtrusive investigations since 1952 have led to the deletion of 125,000 ineligible from the rolls and the inscription of a corresponding number

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of eligible children in their place. The Jordan Government also agreed in the early part of 1966 to certain more radical measures but felt compelled to postpone their implementation owing to political developments affecting public security later in the year.

The second method would be for contributing governments to try to enforce corrective action by resorting to their power of the purse. Any enforced rectification of this kind would probably have to be of an arbitrary and rough-and-ready character. It would also involve the risk of jeopardising public security in the host countries. The decision to run that risk would have to be taken by the contributors themselves in the light of their assessment of the true state of need for rations among the refugees and of the probable effects of their action on public order in the host countries. The contributing governments cannot expect UNRWA to take this decision for them. By reason of its character as an international agency answerable to the General Assembly and by reason of the terms of the directions it has received from the General Assembly, UNRWA is required to proceed in this matter in co-operation with the host governments.

The distribution of rations is of course only one part, though the most important and the most costly, of the activities embraced within UNRWA's relief function. And that function is only one of the three main fields of UNRWA activity - relief, health and education. As far as UNRWA is aware, there has been no criticism among contributors of the other items in its relief programme or of the health and education programmes.

The relief services at present account for about 45% of UNRWA's expenditure. In addition to the rations these services comprise shelter, supplementary feeding (i.e. the distribution of milk and the provision of a cooked mid-day meal to certain categories of refugees specially vulnerable to nutritional deficiency, such as small children and nursing and pregnant women) and clothing and cash grants for individuals suffering from special hardship. The shelter programme is not simply a form of temporary relief; it also has importance and value as a means of rehabilitation, particularly

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when the shelter can be provided in areas where there are opportunities of employment. The idea of "clearing the refugee camps", which figured so prominently in the efforts to solve the European refugee problem, is inapplicable to the problem of the Palestine refugees. Since, pending a political solution of the whole problem, there is nowhere else for the refugees living in the UNRWA camps to go, the best they can look forward to is that in time, by their own efforts and those of the host government and UNRWA, the living conditions in these camps will be improved. In fact, this is already happening, particularly in the urban areas, and some of the accommodation recently provided by UNRWA, although not much more than the nucleus of a decent dwelling, does enable the occupants, in the course of time and as their means permit, to add more rooms and to turn the refugee hut into a simple but not unsatisfactory home comparable with those occupied by the poorer sections of the local population. Given the conditions in the host countries and the resources available, the better UNRWA camps would seem to be a fairly effective and realistic form of low-cost housing.

The health services at present account for about 13% of UNRWA's expenditure. They comprise curative and preventive medical services and sanitation for the camps. Although cheap and simple, they are effective and the health of the refugees is generally good. Notable work has been done in the care of mothers and children, the eradication of malaria, the control of infectious diseases, including especially trachoma, and the restoration of children suffering from dehydration. An aspect which should not be overlooked is that, as the economic productivity of the refugee community progressively increases, the value of the health services in protecting and enhancing the efficiency of refugee labour acquires an economic, as well as a humanitarian, justification.

The education services account for the remaining 42% of UNRWA's budget and the cost is rising by about \$750,000 annually. In general education UNRWA aims to provide nine years schooling for virtually all

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refugee children and a further three years of higher secondary education for a minority selected on academic merit. Quantitatively, this aim is at present being met, though many of the schools, especially those in rented premises, are crowded and unsatisfactory and many also have to operate double shifts in order to accommodate all the children. There is an urgent need for a large programme of school building, but this is at present held up for lack of funds. Qualitatively, the programme of general education is unsatisfactory owing to the low level of the teaching in many of the schools. UNRWA is seeking to remedy this by the in-service training of teachers through the UNRWA/Unesco Institute of Education. The ten teacher training and vocational training centres established by UNRWA have places for about 3,500 students. They are among the best institutions of this kind operating in the Middle East. They have proved very effective in rendering young refugees employable. None of the graduates come back on to the ration rolls. Many of them get well-paid jobs which enable them to support and help in educating other members of their family. Finally, UNRWA provides some 620 university scholarships for specially promising refugee students selected on a basis of need and academic merit.

One respect in which the UNRWA services, particularly in the field of education, have been severely criticised by the host governments is that they do not correspond to any objective assessment of the real needs of the refugee community but merely to an estimate of the funds which the Agency expects to have available from year to year. There is certainly some substance in this point, although the Agency has not in the past felt that it would serve a useful purpose for it to attempt to construct its budget on the basis of a theoretical assessment of refugee needs and without regard to a realistic appraisal of the funds likely to be available. In fact, each year UNRWA has submitted to the General Assembly a budget envisaging expenditure of some millions of dollars more than the amounts later received in the form of governmental pledges and other income. And so each year it has subsequently had to recast its actual working budget in more conservative terms.

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However, faced with sharply rising costs of education, which are now clearly outrunning the resources likely to be available to UNRWA, and in response to urgent representations by the Ministries of Education of the four host countries, the Agency has undertaken to prepare an education programme and budget showing what would, in the opinion of the Agency's educational advisers, constitute a reasonable provision for education and training to meet the needs of the refugee community assuming that adequate funds were available. It is clear that such a programme is likely to entail an annual expenditure considerably in excess of the current provision in UNRWA's budget.

This illustrates and underlines the fundamental financial predicament with which UNRWA is faced in the financing of its programme. In accordance with the mandate given to it by the General Assembly, it is attempting to carry out a programme of a continuing nature meeting basic, essential needs of over a million people. But it is expected to provide these services without the assurance of adequate funds and on the basis of uncertain, voluntary annual contributions. In fact, its revenue has remained more or less static for some years past. Meanwhile, its financial obligations, particularly in regard to education, have grown inexorably. Not without reason, the Commissioner-General suggested in his last Annual Report that "it may be that the General Assembly will feel that the time has come to take a fresh, searching look at the whole method and basis of financing UNRWA's services".

Although the case for continuing and even expanding the aid supplied to the refugees through UNRWA ought to be decided on its merits in terms of the need of the refugees for services such as those provided by UNRWA, there are of course other considerations, extraneous to the Agency's specific mandate, which may influence contributing governments in favour of continuing or increasing their support for UNRWA. It can hardly be questioned that the presence and operation of UNRWA symbolising the continuing interest and involvement of the United Nations in the problem

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of the Palestine refugees, has been a significant factor in helping to maintain such precarious peace and stability as exists in this dangerous region of the world. UNRWA has served as a sort of political lightning conductor in the storm centre of the Middle East. The point can perhaps best be appreciated by posing the question: "What would be the consequences in terms of increased friction and diminished stability if UNRWA were removed from the scene?" Perhaps it is not too much to suggest that the support given over the years to the refugees through UNRWA by the contributing governments has been a relatively cheap investment in preserving peace in the Middle East.

A further consideration of this kind which is less often appreciated is the effect which the existence and continued operation of UNRWA have had in creating a political climate in the Arab World permitting the gradual, progressive rehabilitation of the refugees within the economic and social fabric of the Arab countries of the Middle East to proceed unobtrusively and without hindrance or controversy. This is a politically sensitive issue for Arab opinion; but it has been effectively removed from inter-Arab politics because UNRWA is there to bear the responsibility and because UNRWA has succeeded in presenting individual rehabilitation (as distinct from mass resettlement) in terms which are politically acceptable to Arab opinion - the main point of emphasis being that the young refugees will need education and training, wherever their future may lie.

The Major Contributors

UNRWA is financed by voluntary annual contributions from about fifty of the member states of the United Nations. The bulk of its funds come from the United States, which has year after year provided 70% of all the income received from governmental sources. The next largest contributor is the United Kingdom, which has usually provided about 18%. The Agency is deeply indebted to the United States Government for its generous steadfast support. Without it, UNRWA could not have operated at all and the condition of the refugees would certainly be far worse than it is today.

In recent years the Agency has been running into increasing financial difficulty. For the past four years it has incurred deficits - \$ $\frac{1}{2}$ mn. in 1963, \$2 mn. in 1964, \$2.5 mn. in 1965, and something over \$1 million this year. In 1967 UNRWA faces a deficit of over \$4 million. This is in relation to total annual expenditure of about \$39 million. The deficits have so far been met from reserves which had been carried forward from earlier years, but these reserves are now virtually exhausted.

The main cause of UNRWA's financial troubles has been rising costs - more children entering school, higher prices for the foodstuffs and other commodities which are supplied to the refugees and rising living costs in the Arab host countries, which are reflected in the bill for the salaries and wages of the 11,500 locally recruited staff employed by UNRWA. (They are mostly themselves Palestinian refugees). For three years past, UNRWA has made strenuous efforts to economise in its expenditure, particularly for administrative overheads, and has in fact effected economies of over \$1 million a year, mainly by reducing its international staff from about 150 to less than 80. But these savings have been swallowed up by rising costs. UNRWA is continuing to economise, wherever possible, but there is little room left for further significant savings unless it were decided to reduce substantially the services available to the refugees. Certainly there is no possibility of meeting the massive deficit confronting

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the Agency by means of further economies in administrative overheads.

A contributory cause of the Agency's financial troubles has been the action of the major contributors - that is the United States and the United Kingdom - in reducing their contributions to UNRWA. In the financial year 1965/66 the United States reduced its contribution by \$1.8 million (from \$24.7 to \$22.9 million) and is reducing its contribution for 1966/67 by a further \$700,000 (to \$22.2 mn). The United Kingdom has followed suit by reducing its contribution in the current calendar year by \$400,000 (from \$5.4 mn to \$5 mn). Next year, the U.K. contribution will be reduced by a further $\frac{1}{2}$ mn. In all, the reduction in UNRWA's revenue from the two governments that have in the past contributed nearly nine-tenths of the Agency's income will amount to \$3.4 mn. a year. The total income in 1966 from governmental contributions will be about \$35 mn.

With particular regard to the United States' contribution, a point to be borne in mind is that only part of it represents overseas expenditure of dollars. The remainder is in the form of donated foodstuffs and local currencies accumulated in counterpart funds in the U.A.R. and Syria. For example, in 1965/66 the contribution of \$22.9 mn. was made up of \$9.6 mn. of dollars, \$5.6 mn. of local currencies and \$7.7 mn. of commodities.

UNRWA started 1966 with an expected deficit of over \$4 mn but had some success during the year in obtaining increased contributions from other governments (their contributions for 1966 add up to 21% of the total as against some 12% in previous years - the combined effect of the reductions made by the major contributors and of the increased contributions from elsewhere); but this will not suffice to offset the fall in the contributions from the United States and the United Kingdom. And it is doubtful whether UNRWA can hope for as good a response in future years; it has got by this year mainly thanks to a special, one-time contribution of \$2 million from Sweden. Even on a most optimistic forecast of the response from other governments, it is clear that, so long as UNRWA is financed by voluntary governmental contributions, it rests with the major contributors to

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decide whether and for how long and at what level services should continue to be provided for the Arab refugees from Palestine.

In making the reductions in their contributions, the major contributors have not attempted to arrange matters so that the impact of the reductions fell on services of which they disapproved or which they considered to be of lesser priority. The result has been that a large part of the impact of the reductions has fallen on the education and training of the young refugees, on which UNRWA now spends about 42% of its budget. This would seem to be self-defeating from the standpoint of the major contributors themselves. Education and training have proved to be the one effective contribution that the international community can make to the rehabilitation of the Palestine refugees and, hence, to a partial solution of the problem (on the social and economic, though not the political, plane).

It is particularly disheartening that this should be happening just when, for the first time since the tragedy of 1948, one can begin to discern some clear light at the end of the tunnel of frustration and disappointment through which the refugees and their supporters in the international community have been struggling for the past eighteen years. In his report on the problem written in 1959, Hammarskjöld wrote -

"the unemployed population represented by the Palestine refugees should be regarded not as a liability but, more justly, as an asset for the future; it is a reservoir of manpower which in the desirable general economic development will assist in the creation of higher standards for the whole population of the area."

When that was written, many must have dismissed it as hopelessly visionary; but now one can truly begin to see the substance in the vision. Opinions vary, of course, about the pace at which the refugee community is being transformed from a liability to an asset. A reasonably optimistic view would be that, provided that the social, economic and industrial development of the Arab World continues at least at the present rate and provided the young refugees continue to receive the education and training they require in order to be able to compete for the jobs created by this development, one may expect that, withi^s the course of five to ten years, the Palestine

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refugee problem, as a problem of refugee relief, would be reduced to a relatively small hard core of aging and virtually irredeemable refugees and to the special problem of the Gaza Strip. The whole process of rehabilitation may also be further and dramatically speeded up if, as seems likely, the voracious sponge of European industrial development begins to draw in large numbers of young men from the Arab World, as it has already drawn in so many thousands of workers, less educated and less skilled than the young Arab refugees, from neighbouring Turkey.

But everything depends on maintaining the provision of education and training for the young refugees and indeed increasing it at least sufficiently to take care of the natural growth in the refugee population. On its merits as technical assistance or development aid, the UNRWA/Unesco education programme is well worth supporting. It has taken shape under the salutary discipline of a chronic shortage of funds and it will stand comparison in terms of economy and efficiency with similar schemes of educational development elsewhere. When there is added the crucial role which this programme is playing in providing a partial remedy to the stubborn, bitter problem of the Palestine refugees, the case for the major contributors to continue and even increase their support for education and training - whatever they may choose to do about other aspects of the problem - seems to be overwhelming.

No-one in UNRWA would overlook the reasons that have been given to justify the reductions. The major contributors have good cause to be dissatisfied with one aspect of the services provided for the refugees, namely, the abuse of the ration rolls. But, as already explained, this concerns merely one section of one of UNRWA's three main activities - relief, health and education. No-one questions the value of the other relief services - housing, cooked meals for small children and individual welfare - and no-one questions the value of the health and education programmes. The serious abuse of the ration rolls is largely confined to Jordan and is really a problem of politics and the security of the régime rather than a problem of administering relief. The embassies of the two major

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contributors in Amman have been at least as cautious as UNRWA itself in lifting the lid of this Pandora's box. Generally, as indicated above, there is much that needs saying about the whole problem of the rations in order to put it into proper perspective. Mere condemnation of the refugees, the host governments and UNRWA for their failure to remedy admitted abuses is not an adequate response to a complex problem and does less than justice to all three parties.

Then there is the argument that the United States and the United Kingdom have been carrying too large a share of the burden of supporting the Palestine refugees for too long. This would seem to justify urging other governments to pay more, but does it justify the United States and United Kingdom governments in paying less? The answer to this question must be a matter of individual judgment depending on how one interprets the sad history of Palestine and its Arab inhabitants and how one judges the extent to which the United States and the United Kingdom have acquired, by reason of their past actions, a unique moral obligation towards this particular group of homeless and impoverished people distinct from and anterior to that general humanitarian obligation which both countries now acknowledge to relieve distress and promote social and economic progress in the world at large.

On this point, since it is so much a matter of personal judgment, it would be inappropriate to comment beyond saying that, if it were conceded that a unique moral obligation exists on the part of the United Kingdom and the United States towards the Palestine refugees, it would seem questionable whether this obligation could be said to have been discharged by the aid already given to the refugees through UNRWA - at least so long as the question of the property which the refugees left behind in Israel remains unresolved.

The Host Governments

The attitude of the Arab host governments to the refugees and, in particular, to the process of their de facto rehabilitation in the society and economy of the Arab World is often misunderstood and perhaps lends itself to misunderstanding and misrepresentation. They are convinced that the vital political interests of the refugees would be adversely affected if the Arab governments were overtly to recognise and admit the fact of any extensive reintegration of the refugees in the Arab World. They believe, no doubt with good reason, that this would be seized on as support for the thesis that the appropriate and practicable solution for the refugees is their resettlement in the Arab World and that there is no call therefore to keep the issue of repatriation alive. In public statements they tend therefore to deny or minimise the extent of rehabilitation among the refugees. Hence they are often accused of obstructing the rehabilitation of the refugees and of keeping them in a condition of destitution and dependence on international charity "as pawns in the game against Israel". In fact, however, there is little substance in this allegation. On the contrary, the attitude of the host governments towards the refugees has in general been humane and helpful. In spite of the problems which face these governments in providing a livelihood for their own rapidly expanding populations, they have not obstructed the refugees' efforts to find employment and improve their lot. Often the host governments have taken positive action to assist the refugees in these efforts. This is not to say that the Arab governments do not use the refugee issue in their political campaign against Israel, it is, after all, an issue on which Israel is specially vulnerable. But this is a very different matter from saying that the host governments are deliberately and inhumanly keeping the refugees in misery in order to provide a political weapon against Israel.

Ungenerous and misleading comparisons are, unfortunately, sometimes made between the assistance which the Palestine refugees have received from Western countries, particularly the two major contributing governments, and that which they have received from their fellow Arabs in the host countries.

Since UNRWA began its operations, the host governments have made contributions to UNRWA's services amounting to over \$9 million. But also, during the same period, they have recorded in the Agency's annual reports direct contributions to the refugees (not through UNRWA) amounting to over \$70 million. These direct contributions take the form of education and health services, housing, social welfare and other public services. For none of these services are they reimbursed by UNRWA. Nor, of course, do these recorded contributions take account of the many imponderable but certainly substantial social and economic repercussions which have resulted from the presence of large numbers of homeless refugees in the host countries and which must have adversely affected the living standards and prospects of the ordinary citizens of these countries. Bearing in mind that the host countries are for the most part not richly endowed with natural resources and that the host governments are themselves faced with grave economic and social problems, the contribution they have made to the support of their unfortunate brethren in the Palestine refugee community has in fact been notably generous and will bear comparison with the support which has been provided from elsewhere, including that from the major contributors.

A New Initiative?

It is natural that those who, for so many years, have been footing the bill for the support of the Palestine refugees, and indeed all who are concerned for the welfare of these unfortunate people, should from time to time cast about for some dramatic new approach, some new formula which might produce a break-through towards a final solution of the problem. No-one would be happier than those who have the task of administering UNRWA if it were in their power to devise and recommend some such new, more hopeful initiative. They fully understand how disappointing the supporters of the refugees and of the Agency may find a response which is confined to advocating the mere continuation and further development of measures already in operation. But, from the comments offered above, it will be appreciated that such a response ought not to be dismissed as a confession of failure or a surrender to inertia and immobilism. The measures already in operation are in fact making an impact, gradual but markedly beneficial, on the problem.

For UNRWA the first priority in present circumstances must be to secure additional financial support so as to enable existing services to be maintained and to avert the threatened collapse of the whole present structure of aid to the refugees. Assuming this to have been achieved, there are three possibilities that may be worth considering with a view to accelerating the progress which is already in train. The first is to expand and improve the education and training of the young refugees, the second is to provide more and better housing and to provide better roads, drainage, water supplies and lighting in the existing camps, the third is to try to separate the two issues of repatriation and compensation and to secure for the refugees some restitution for the material loss they have suffered without, however, thereby prejudicing their claim to repatriation.

An Expanded Programme of Education and Training

The creation of the existing UNRWA/UNESCO educational system within the space of the last sixteen years - no long time in terms of educational

planning - has been a remarkable achievement. But there are deficiencies and needs which are not being met. As explained earlier, the UNRWA Department of Education is now engaged on a review of the whole content and adequacy of the education services at present being provided for the refugee community, and considered suggestions for improving and expanding the programme should await the outcome of this review. But, as a provisional outline, the following would seem to be the most urgent and important needs.

- (1) a large programme of school building to accommodate increases in the school population, to eliminate double-shifting of classes and to replace unsatisfactory rented premises,
- (2) a rapid expansion of the in-service training of teachers provided by the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education so as to accelerate the attainment of a satisfactory standard of instruction in the UNRWA schools,
- (3) a substantially increased provision of teachers to enable the teacher/pupil ratio in UNRWA schools to be brought down from 1.50 to 1.40 in elementary and 1.35 in preparatory (i.e. junior secondary schools),
- (4) a much larger provision of teachers and equipment for the teaching of science in UNRWA preparatory schools,
- (5) the provision of home economics teaching for girls in all UNRWA preparatory schools (at present this is confined to Gaza),
- (6) a larger provision of subsidised places for refugee pupils in government and private upper secondary schools,
- (7) an expansion of professional and vocational training, including particularly some technical training at a higher level than at the existing UNRWA vocational training centres and also some special provision for the training of science teachers,

- (8) an expansion of the highly successful schemes to enable graduates of the vocational training centres to obtain industrial experience in Europe,
- (9) a considerably larger provision of university scholarships, including a proportion reserved for tenure at the American University of Beirut (where the standard of tuition is high but the costs of attendance are at least double those at other universities in the Arab countries of the Middle East).

Over the next five years a programme of this kind might require funds of the order of \$5 mn. for capital costs and between \$15 and \$20 mn. for recurrent costs. There might be advantage in opening the doors of the professional and vocational training centres to other deserving students besides refugees. This would confront UNRWA with a procedural difficulty since it has no authority to disburse funds and provide services for persons other than refugees. But the existing programme is already a joint UNRWA/UNESCO enterprise and the difficulty could be got over by channelling the funds for the expanded programme through UNESCO for use, in collaboration with UNRWA, primarily but not exclusively for the benefit of Palestine refugees. In general, there might be advantage in according a predominant role to UNESCO in the planning and direction of such an expanded programme, the role of UNRWA being confined to providing the administrative framework and logistical services. This, together with the admission of non-refugee students to the training institutions, should improve the prospects of a closer and more positive association of the Ministries of Education in the host countries with the whole programme. In time, the existing UNRWA/UNESCO programme for the Palestine refugees, supplemented by an expanded and less exclusively "refugee" programme on the lines outlined above, might provide the foundation for a more ambitious and comprehensive scheme of regional educational development in the Arab countries of the Middle East.

Housing and the Urbanisation of Camps

Owing to shortage of funds, UNRWA's capacity to promote the rehabilitation of refugee families by the provision of housing and by the improvement of the environmental conditions in the refugee camps is now virtually at a standstill. Over the next five years UNRWA could, with great advantage, spend funds of the order of \$3 to \$4 mn. for these purposes. Prominent among the projects to be undertaken would be the rehousing of the 17,000 refugees living in the squalid camps around Beirut. This alone would require about \$1 mn. UNRWA is also facing increasing demands from the refugees living in camps for better roads and pathways, better sewage and surface drainage, more ample water supplies permitting those who can afford the expense to pipe the water into their houses, and the supply of electricity for street and domestic lighting. The urbanisation or gradual transformation of these camps into passable suburbs and townships and villages is as useful an amelioration of the problem as any that can be undertaken in the absence of a real, lasting solution.

Compensation

When the refugees fled from Palestine, they took with them what they could carry, leaving behind their homes and other immovable property. They expected to return and recover their property in a short time, when the fighting had stopped. In the course of the eighteen years that have elapsed since then, many of their homes and other buildings have been destroyed or converted to different use. Much of their agricultural property has been redistributed to Israeli citizens. Some has been replanted or converted to non-agricultural use. Possession and control of the abandoned Arab property have been vested in a custodian appointed by the Government of Israel and this official has wide powers over the use and disposal of the property. The Government of Israel has stated in the General Assembly that, under Israeli law, the refugees' ownership of the property has been extinguished, that the disposal of the property is now a matter of internal jurisdiction for Israel alone and that neither the refugees nor the United Nations nor any other external party has any right to interfere in the matter. At the same time, the Government of Israel has indicated that it is in principle prepared to pay compensation to the former owners. It has, however, argued that, in fixing the amount of compensation, account should be taken of the property abandoned by former Jewish residents of the Arab countries who are now living in Israel and that the value of this property should be offset against any compensation that may in due course be paid to the Arab refugees. Developing this theme, spokesmen of the Government of Israel have maintained that what has in fact occurred has been an exchange of population between Israel and the Arab States.

The refugees and the Arab governments reject entirely the Israeli thesis and have sought, so far unsuccessfully, to have the General Assembly appoint an international custodian to take control of the property left behind by the refugees and to use the proceeds for their benefit, pending a solution of the refugee problem.

Meanwhile, the General Assembly has year after year reaffirmed its resolution of December 1948 which asserts that the refugees ought to be given the choice of returning to their homes to live at peace with their neighbours or of receiving compensation if they chose not to return.

Meanwhile, also, the Palestine Conciliation Commission has been patiently getting on with the laborious task of identifying and evaluating the property which the refugees left behind. The Commission announced last year that it had completed this task. It has not however made public any total valuation of the property. Arab spokesmen have spoken in terms of a value amounting in present monetary terms to two thousand million dollars. One somewhat unexpected feature which the Commission's work has revealed is that a large proportion of the refugees possessed some immovable property of one kind or another. Previously there had been suggestions that most of them were landless and that the ownership of the property had been concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of landowners.

When Count Bernadotte first enunciated on 16 September 1948 the principle that

"the right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective",

and when this principle was incorporated in December of that year in the General Assembly's resolution, no-one of course foresaw that eighteen years later the refugees would still be living in exile, or that in the meantime their homes and property would have been diverted to the use of others, or that during this long period they would have received no benefit whatsoever from their property and no compensation or restitution for its loss. In 1948 no-one had any doubt that, in thus linking the two issues of repatriation and compensation and in supporting the simple proposition that the refugees should be given a choice between the two, they were acting in the best interests of the refugees. Since then the proposition has been reaffirmed

year after year by the General Assembly and has not, overtly at least, been subjected to scrutiny and question except by the representatives of Israel. The Arab governments in particular have always attached special importance to the annual reaffirmation of the 1948 Resolution, since it enshrined the principle that the refugees ought to be given the opportunity of returning to their homes. In this they reflect opinion among the refugees who have seized on the Resolution as their charter to return to their homes without bothering much about its precise meaning and effect.

Yet it may be questioned whether, as events have worked out, the Resolution and the character it has acquired as a shibboleth of good intentions towards the refugees have been wholly in their interests. Certainly the repeated affirmation by the General Assembly of the principle that the refugees ought to be given the opportunity of returning to their homes accords with the wishes of the refugees themselves and the views of the Arab governments and of the general public in the Arab World and serves to assert and maintain the refugees' vital political interests, as they and their supporters understand them. Having taken its stand on the simple justice of giving the refugees the opportunity of going back home, the General Assembly should no doubt continue to maintain that stand. But the linking of repatriation with compensation for loss of property and the balancing of the option to return against the option to receive compensation is another matter. One may have the fullest sympathy for the refugees and the fullest understanding of their political hopes and interests and yet feel that this linking of repatriation with compensation has served them ill and has deprived them of restitution which, in plain justice, they should have received.

For the fact is that, although no-one questions the material loss they have suffered, still for eighteen years they have received no restitution or compensation for that loss. And the reason for this is that, because repatriation and compensation have been linked together and because there has been no repatriation, therefore there has been no compensation. Moreover, throughout this time, as a result of the linking of the two issues in the

Resolution, the question of compensation has been discussed not in terms of equity and obligation but on a "quid pro quo" basis which envisages that, in return for receiving compensation, the refugees must give up their cherished hope - as they see it, their right - of returning home. No serious consideration has been given to offering them compensation while enabling them to retain - for whatever it may be worth - their claim or right to repatriation.

It is understandable that those on whom the burden of paying compensation would fall should seek to extract what advantage they can from discharging this heavy commitment and, superficially at least, there must be attraction for them in the idea that the payment of compensation should be used to extinguish the troublesome claims of the refugees to return to their homes. But, even if considerations of equity are left aside, it is questionable if this idea has much practical merit. An enforced renunciation of repatriation extracted from the refugees as the price of receiving compensation would not be given ex animo and would not, in fact, be any assurance against the continued prosecution of their claim to repatriation. Nothing is going to stop the refugees' longing to return and agitating to be allowed to do so. As far as the practical effect is concerned, what is important is how the refugees would use the compensation they received and how this would affect their future as a focus of potential trouble and instability in the Middle East. Clearly, most of them would use any compensation they received in order to establish themselves more securely and to put their roots down deeper in the economy and society where they find themselves today. To the extent that they did so this would reduce the rootlessness of the refugee community - which is where the danger they represent to the peace and stability of the region can be mitigated. Nothing will dispel their determination to recover, some day, their country and their homes, something can be done to root them more firmly where they are.

There is no telling whether the refugees, if offered compensation without prejudice to their claims to repatriation, would avail themselves of

this offer. Possibly they might prefer to continue to forego compensation in order to avoid any de facto prejudice to their claim to repatriation. But if the offer were made, the rest of the world could face the Arab refugees with an easier conscience than they can today.

SummaryPossible Solutions

1. Theoretically, there are four possible solutions:
(1) repatriation, (2) emigration overseas, (3) mass resettlement, and (4) individual rehabilitation.
2. In practice, only the fourth has proved practicable and politically acceptable.
3. Under the surface, much solid quiet progress has been made in this direction.
4. Such progress depends primarily on the efforts of the refugees themselves and on the level of economic activity in the Arab World.
5. Education and training for the young refugees are an important adjunct.
6. Individual rehabilitation provides only a partial remedy, not a solution.
7. But the lack of a permanent, definitive solution does not mean that the problem is stagnant or deteriorating.
8. Unfortunately, the gradual, diffuse process of economic and social betterment promoted by means of the rehabilitation of individuals is difficult to reflect adequately in published statistics.

A Hopeless Problem?

9. Pessimistic generalisations about the refugee problem and UNRWA's work should not be accepted without defining the terms in which they are made.
10. It is true that the refugee population is growing rapidly by natural increase.
11. It is untrue that the number of ration recipients (i.e. the number of refugees prima facie dependent on UNRWA for the bare necessities of life) is increasing. It has in fact declined both absolutely and relatively to the whole refugee population.

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12. The essential fact is that, in fifteen years, the community has grown by 40% but has managed to support itself without any increase of donated foodstuffs. This is evidence of progress towards self-support rather than the reverse.
13. Politically the problem may well have grown more intractable with time. But that lies outside UNRWA's province.
14. It is, however, true that the needs of the refugee community in respect of health and education services have grown with the natural increase of the population.
15. It would be perverse and self-defeating to reduce these services.
16. The operation in which UNRWA is engaged is not endless, though it is certainly long-term. Eventually a time must come when the refugees will provide their own public services as tax-paying members of the society in which they are finally established.
17. Nor is UNRWA's role merely that of a custodial or holding operation. It is in fact much more constructive than these terms imply.
18. It is not the continued existence of UNRWA which perpetuates the problem.
19. To suggest that UNRWA's work has been so much wasted time, effort and money does less than justice to both those who support and those who serve the refugees.
20. In fact, UNRWA's record contains notable achievements, not merely as a refugee relief agency, but also as an instrument of technical assistance and development aid.

The Role of UNRWA

21. The abuses in the distribution of rations need to be kept in proportion. All too often overseas observers concentrate on this and ignore the constructive aspects of UNRWA's work.

22. The problem of the ration rolls is complex and the complicating considerations (listed on pages 10 to 12) need to be taken into account in reaching a balanced judgment.
23. In attempting to correct the abuses, two courses are possible:
- (1) to persuade the host governments to cooperate with the Agency;
 - (2) for contributing governments to enforce rectification by resorting to their power of the purse;
24. UNRWA, by reason of its nature and mandate, can only operate by co-operation with the host governments.
25. If contributing governments decide to enforce rectification by their power of the purse, the decision must be theirs; UNRWA cannot take it for them.
26. The distribution of rations is only one part of UNRWA's relief function and relief is only one of the three functions - relief, health and education - discharged by UNRWA.
27. There has been no criticism among contributing governments of any aspect of UNRWA's work other than the rations.
28. The host governments have, however, criticised UNRWA's services generally, and with particular reference to education, on the grounds that they are inadequate and have been based not on any objective assessment of the real needs of the refugee community but merely on assumptions by UNRWA about the amount of funds likely to be available from year to year.
29. UNRWA is at present engaged in an attempt to prepare the outline of an education programme based on the needs of the refugees rather than the funds available.
30. The host governments' attitude reflects UNRWA's fundamental financial predicament. It is expected to provide essential, continuing services without the assurance of funds and on the basis of uncertain voluntary annual contributions.

31. The time has come to take a fresh, searching look at the whole method and basis of financing UNRWA's services.
32. The contribution which the existence and continued operation of UNRWA make to maintaining such precarious peace and stability as exists in the Middle East should not be forgotten or under-estimated.
33. Nor should the effect which the existence and continued operation of UNRWA have had in creating a political climate in the Arab World permitting the progressive, unobtrusive and unimpeded rehabilitation of the refugees.

The Major Contributors

34. The financial difficulties for UNRWA which arise from inexorably increasing costs have been compounded by the action of the major contributors in reducing their contributions. These reductions now amount to about \$3.4 mn a year, which is roughly 10% of UNRWA's income from governmental contributions.
35. Only about two-fifths of the U.S. contribution involves dollar payments. The remainder is in foodstuffs and local (counterpart) currencies.
36. In 1966 other governments have contributed over 20% as against about 12% in earlier years. But this still left a gap of \$1 mn and the prospects for the future are grim. Special appeals lose force with repetition.
37. The major contributors have not arranged their reductions so that the impact fell on services of which they disapproved or which they considered to be of lesser priority.
38. Much of the impact has thus fallen on education, which is self-defeating from the contributors' own standpoint.
39. This is particularly disheartening at the present time when clear evidence is emerging of the transformation of the refugee community, through education and employment, from a liability to an asset. /...

40. Does dissatisfaction with the ration rolls justify cutting education?
41. The major contributors may well feel they have been carrying too large a share of the burden for too long. This would seem to justify urging other governments to pay more; but does it justify the major contributors in paying less?
42. This raises the questions (which are matters for personal judgment) whether the major contributors have a unique moral obligation towards the Palestine refugees and whether they can feel that they have discharged this obligation - at least so long as the question of refugee property remains unresolved,

A New Initiative?

45. UNRWA's main concern must be to avert the threatened collapse of its existing services.
46. Assuming this to have been achieved, three possibilities would seem to be worth exploring:-
- (1) an expanded programme of education and training;
 - (2) increased provision for housing and the urbanisation of camps;
 - (3) a new effort to separate the issues of repatriation and compensation and to secure for the refugees some restitution for the material loss they have suffered without, however, thereby prejudicing their claim to repatriation.

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Political and Financial
Series

STEERING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

United Nations General Assembly:

Twenty-Second Session

Item 34: UNRWA: Report of the Commissioner General

Note by the Foreign Office

The attached brief for the British Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly has been prepared by the Foreign Office.

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

6 October, 1967.

BRIEF FOR UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

Item 34: Report of the Commissioner-General
of U.N.R.W.A.

Section 1: Outline of Brief

Section 2 lists the United Nations documents referred to. Section 3 gives an account of Arab/Israel relations with reference to UNRWA, and the Conciliation Commission. Section 4 summarises the Commissioner-General's report and the report of the Secretary-General's Personal Representative on refugees in the Middle East. Section 5 covers policy and has been written on the assumption that there will be a separate debate on the Middle East generally.

Section 2: Documents

2. The following United Nations documents are of interest.

1. The Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for the period 1 July, 1966 to 30 June, 1967.
2. Report of the Secretary-General under G.A. Resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council Resolution 237 (1967) (A/6797).
3. The following General Assembly Resolutions:

212 (III)	of 10 November, 1948	
194 (III)	of 11 December, 1948	Annex 1
302 (IV)	of 8 December, 1949	
393 (V)	of 2 December, 1950	
394 (V)	of 14 December, 1950	
512 (VI)	of 26 January, 1952	
513 (VI)	of 26 January, 1952	
614 (VII)	of 6 November, 1952	
720 (VIII)	of 27 November, 1953	
818 (IX)	of 4 December, 1954	
916 (X)	of 3 December, 1955	
1018 (XI)	of 28 February, 1957	
1191 (XII)	of 12 December, 1957	
1315 (XIII)	of 12 December, 1958	
1456 (XIV)	of 9 December, 1959	
1604 (XV)	of 21 April, 1961	
1725 (XVI)	of 3 January, 1962	
1856 (XVII)	of 20 December, 1962	
1912 (XVIII)	of 3 December, 1963	
2002 (XIX)	of 10 February, 1965	
2002 (XX)	of 15 December, 1965	
2154 (XXI)	of 17 November, 1966	Annex 2

Section 3: Background

Events which led to the establishment of UNRWA and the
Palestine Conciliation Commission

3. On 14 May, 1948, the British Mandate in Palestine formally came to an end. The Jews proclaimed the setting-up of the State of Israel and the fighting between Jews and Arabs in Palestine thereupon developed into open warfare when the

/Arab

Arab armies invaded the frontiers of the former mandatory state on 15 May. A special session of the United Nations Assembly relieved the Palestine Commission (not to be confused with the later Conciliation Commission), which had been set up in 1947 to implement the United Nations Partition Plan, from further responsibilities, and a Mediator was appointed by the Security Council.

4. The efforts of both the Security Council and the United Nations Mediators finally brought about a series of armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab States.

5. Each side accused the other of aggression. The Israelis claimed that the Arabs attacked them in direct contravention of the United Nations Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November, 1947 which partitioned Palestine between Jews and Arabs, while the Arabs claimed not only that the setting up of Israel itself was an act of aggression, but that the Israelis overflowed their allocated boundaries and occupied by force territory which had been granted to the Arabs by the United Nations. But at that time the Arabs did not accept the Resolution partitioning Palestine. Some Arabs now regret this, and Arab leaders have called from time to time for the partition Resolution to be implemented (notably President Bourguiba in 1965).

6. During the fighting about half a million Arabs (many of them town dwellers from Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda and Ramle) fled to safety in the neighbouring Arab States of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan (where most went) and Egypt. It is argued by the refugees themselves and by Arab leaders that the refugees were terrorised out of Palestine by systematic Jewish campaigns of brutality designed to make room in Palestine for Jewish immigrants. The Israelis on the other hand maintain that the Arab leaders urged the refugees to leave their homes as a temporary measure. The Arab armies would then have had more room to manoeuvre and, having driven the Jews into the sea, the refugees would have been able to return to their homes. However, by the autumn of 1948 the existence of large numbers of destitute refugees called for immediate relief measures. The General Assembly accordingly passed Resolution No. 212 (III) of 19 November, calling for subscriptions from all members of the United Nations and appointing a Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees to administer a relief programme.

7. The General Assembly then turned its attention to the political situation. This resulted in Resolution No. 194 (III) of 11 December, 1948. Paragraph 2 set up a Conciliation Commission of three member states of the United Nations (France, Turkey and the United States were chosen) which took over the duties of the United Nations Mediator and was instructed to carry out the rest of the Resolution (which amounted, in fact, to achieving an Arab/Israel settlement). The other important paragraph (paragraph No. 11) dealt with refugees.

"Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property for those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, re-settlement and economic and social
/rehabilitation

rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations."

8. This has ever since been taken by the Arabs to justify the return of the refugees and to put Israel in the wrong by not permitting them to do so. The Israelis have argued that the Resolution must be seen as a whole and not simply be reduced to one paragraph dealing with refugees, and go on to argue that the whole of the Resolution cannot possibly be implemented until the Arabs change their attitude towards Israel so radically as to make a peace treaty possible. Meanwhile the Arab States do not even recognise the existence of Israel and maintain that they are still technically at war with the "so-called" state of Israel.

9. Resolution 212 of 19 November, 1948 (see end of paragraph 4 above) instructed the Director of Relief for Palestine Refugees to administer a relief programme to cover nine months till 31 August, 1949. It was still hoped at that time that the Conciliation Commission would be able to liquidate the refugee problem by implementing Resolution No. 194, in particular paragraph 11. But by the autumn of 1949 the General Assembly again had to consider provision for the refugees, and passed Resolution No. 302 (IV) of 8 December, 1949, which set up the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Paragraph 8 of the Resolution established "an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, with power to add not more than three additional members from contributing Governments to advise and assist the Director of UNRWA in the execution of the programme; and the Director and the Advisory Commission shall consult with each Near Eastern Government concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects". UNRWA took over its duties in the field on 1 May, 1950. It embarked on a direct relief and relief works programme. The programme of relief works was not a success and ceased in the middle of 1951.

Conciliation Commission

10. The Conciliation Commission, set up under Resolution No. 194 in December 1948, started work in January 1949. From April to June it held meetings separately in Lausanne with Arab and Israel delegations. On 12 May the Conciliation Commission signed separate protocols with Israel on the one hand and with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the other, agreeing that the territorial boundaries in the United Nations Partition Plan of November, 1947, should be taken as the basis for a discussion about refugees ("respect for their rights and the preservation of their property") and territorial adjustments, where necessary. Israel then offered to accept 100,000 refugees and also to accept, in addition, the refugees in Gaza provided the Gaza Strip was ceded to Israel, and provided that these concessions would only come into effect as a part of a final peace settlement. Jordan and Syria agreed to accept "such refugees as might not return to their homes". Finally Israel agreed to start the "reunion of families scheme", undertaking to accept certain close relatives of those Arabs who did not leave Israel. The Arabs criticised this as too restrictive, maintaining that the term family should be more widely interpreted in its oriental sense. These minor offers appeared

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to represent the limit of agreement between the Arabs and Israelis. Progress was subsequently made only on the "families scheme", and the other offers lapsed mainly because the Arabs insisted that Israel should accept the principle that all refugees could be repatriated, which Israel refused to do.

11. In 1950 the Commission recommended the "return to Israel of as many refugees as would be consistent with their own best interests" and compensation and "reintegration" of those not returning. Two resolutions were then passed by the General Assembly in December. The UNRWA Resolution No. 393 (V) of 2 December, 1950, held that reintegration, either by repatriation or resettlement was essential; set up a reintegration fund of \$30 million and appointed a Negotiating Committee to raise further funds. The second Resolution No. 394 (V) of 14 December instructed the Conciliation Commission to set up an office in Jerusalem to assess the value of the refugees properties, and to arrange for payment of compensation.

12. On 22 May, 1951, the Conciliation Commission set up its office in Jerusalem for the assessment of compensation. To deal with the wider political questions still unsolved the Commission held separate conversations with both sides in Paris, but had to report that neither side was ready to seek stability in the Middle East through full implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions. Israel refused to accept paragraph 11 of Resolution No. 194 (repatriation) and the Arabs refused to accept paragraph 5 (settlement of all disputes). The General Assembly in Resolution No. 512 (VI) of 26 January, 1952, simply noted with regret that no progress had been made by the Commission; urged the Governments to settle their outstanding differences, making use of United Nations facilities; and instructed the Commission to continue its work.

13. In 1952 the Commission restricted its activities to the two technical questions of assessing compensation and arranging for the payment of blocked accounts. In the Ad Hoc Committee the Arabs attacked the Commission and said that action must be taken:

- (i) to put Jerusalem under United Nations control;
- (ii) to repatriate refugees;
- (iii) to protect and guarantee free access to the Holy Places.

(All three points are specifically covered by Resolution No. 194.) The Arabs went on to accuse the Commission of partiality towards Israel and complained that its members, being under instructions from their own governments, could not deal honestly with the problems facing them, and recommended that membership of the commission should be enlarged. Various draft resolutions were put forward but none was successful, with the result that no resolution about the Conciliation Commission was passed by the General Assembly at its Seventh Session. From 1952 to April 1961 the activities of the Commission were governed by Resolution No. 512 (VI) of 26 January, 1952. Apart from routine work on assessment of compensation and the release of blocked accounts, the Conciliation Commission attempted virtually nothing during those years. In 1961 a draft Arab-inspired resolution recommended the establishment of "appropriate and effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights of the Arab refugees". This was strongly opposed by the Americans, because it would be illegal infringement of Israel sovereignty; Israel

had appointed a custodian of refugee property shortly after the end of the fighting. In order to ride the Arabs off the recommendation about refugee property the Americans were prepared to accept some criticism of the Conciliation Commission. The General Assembly requests the Commission to report within six months on its efforts to implement Resolution No. 194 (III), paragraph 11: vide Resolution No. 1604 (XV).

14. The P.C.C. did not in the event report within 6 months but Western pressure was largely successful in keeping the Commission out of the limelight for the next five years. In April 1966 the P.C.C. published a Working Paper (ASAC 25/W.84 of 28 April, 1966) reporting that the process of identifying and valuing Arab property in Israel had been completed and setting out the methods by which this was done. Close study of the Working Paper revealed that Arabs owned, or had an interest in, over 85% of Israel's land surface. The Working Paper did not give a figure for the total value of this property, but we have since learnt confidentially that at 1947 values it is worth about \$500 million. Allowing for inflation present day values might be as much as \$1000 million, or \$1500 million if interest were added. The Arabs did not give this Working Paper the study it deserved and have since attacked it.

U.N.R.W.A.

15. In his 1951 report to the Sixth Session of the Assembly the Director of UNRWA recommended the setting up of a three year programme of relief and reintegration (i.e. repatriation and resettlement) with funds of \$50 million and \$200 million respectively. The three year programme would start retrospectively from 1 July, 1951. This was authorised in Resolution No. 513 (VI) of 26 January, 1952. The interesting point in this was the emphasis put on reintegration which, in view of the Conciliation Commission's failure to make progress on repatriation, could only mean resettlement. In the subsequent autumn Assembly meeting the Arabs pointed out that reintegration had come to mean "permanent exile" and complained that the amount set aside for direct relief to refugees was anyway too small. Arab feelings were taken into account by the Assembly in Resolution No. 614 (VII) of 26 November, 1952.

16. In 1953 Egypt, Syria and Jordan signed agreements with the Agency regarding rehabilitation programmes designed to make about 300,000 refugees self-supporting (without prejudice to the right of these refugees to repatriation). The Director-General of UNRWA whose report was generally endorsed by the Advisory Commission made two important suggestions: (i) that host governments (i.e. the Arab governments in whose countries the refugees now were) should take over administrative responsibility for relief work, the money continuing to be provided through UNRWA; and (ii) that Jordan, Syria and Egypt be added to the Advisory Commission. In the Ad Hoc Committee the United States representative indicated for the first time that Congress was most reluctant to continue voting large sums for refugees when Israel and the Arabs showed so little initiative in helping to solve the refugee problem. The United Kingdom supported the Director's suggestion that administrative responsibility for relief work should gradually be transferred to the host governments. The Arabs and Israel were opposed to this. The General Assembly then passed Resolution No. 720 (VIII) of 27 November, 1953.

17. In his 1954 report the Director made three main points:

/(i)

- (i) The belief that the cost of relief work could be reduced as refugees became self-supporting through rehabilitation programmes was proving almost completely unfounded. One reason for this was the unwillingness of both the refugees and host governments to assist with rehabilitation on the grounds that it would prejudice the refugees' right to return.
- (ii) No solution along the lines of the Assembly's resolutions regarding repatriation and compensation was in sight.
- (iii) The need for educational and practical training programmes, as almost half the refugee population was under 15 years of age.

The Director and the Advisory Commission recommended that the Agency's mandate should be extended for five years. They also recommend that the \$200 million fund for rehabilitation (see paragraph 15 above) should be maintained, subject to expenditures already made. During the year Belgium and Lebanon took seats on the Advisory Commission, thus bringing it up to full strength.

18. In the ensuing debate in the Ad Hoc Committee the United States representative stressed the importance of finding new homes and work for refugees who chose to settle in Arab countries, without prejudice to their rights. The Arabs reacted strongly to this approach because, to the extent that rehabilitation succeeded, it prejudiced the refugees right to return. In the event, a resolution embodying the substance of the recommendations made by the Director and the Advisory Commission was passed by the General Assembly as Resolution No. 818 (IX) of 4 December, 1954.

19. Refugee affairs had now reached the stage when UNRWA's mandate had been extended for five years, until 1960. The Agency's work was settling into a fairly routine pattern of relief, education, health services and a small amount of rehabilitation (i.e. resettlement). The Conciliation Commission, sticking only to its limited tasks of assessing the value of refugee property and unblocking accounts, did not affect UNRWA's work. It does not seem necessary to give a detailed account of the debates in these years. Efforts at self-support and rehabilitation were hampered by lack of funds and the continued absence of a political solution of the Palestine problem, as well as by the persistent hostility of the refugees towards major development projects.

20. In 1958, the United States representative said that it was necessary to accelerate the rate at which refugees were made self-supporting. The Arabs opposed this strongly and said that the United Nations must in no circumstances free itself of its responsibility for the refugees until a final solution was reached. Until the refugees were repatriated the United Nations should receive from Israel the revenues derived from refugees property and make them available to the refugees. Israel opposed this but offered to pay compensation in advance of a final peace settlement for any refugees who were resettled. The General Assembly passed Resolutions 916 (X) of 1955, 1018 (XI) of 1957, 1191 (XII) of 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 1959, and 1604 (XV) of 1961.

21. The Mandate was extended from 1961-1963. The Director's Report for 1961 stated that basic relief services were maintained

at the 1960 level in order to concentrate funds on the expansion of education and vocational and teacher training. A special Representative, an American named Dr. Joseph Johnson, had been appointed by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to undertake confidential talks with the Israel and Arab Governments and to find means of progress towards a settlement of the refugee question. His realistic interim report, circulated during the Sixteenth Session, suggested that there was some hope of limited progress. We and the Americans therefore aimed principally at this Session at getting his mandate extended and the United States draft resolution, which was that finally passed as Resolution 1725 (XVI) of 1962 was directed to this end.

22. The main task before the 1962 Assembly was to provide for the extension of the mandate of UNRWA which was due to expire in 1963. Dr. Johnson's proposals, which consisted of offering limited numbers of refugees the choice between repatriation and compensation, were rejected by Israel and were not mentioned in public. He resigned soon after. A draft resolution calling for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs was inspired by Israel. An Arab inspired draft resolution calling for the appointment of a United Nations custodian for Arab property, assets, and property rights within Israel was also put forward; neither in the end was put to a vote. The United States draft resolution, extending the mandate of UNRWA for two years and urging the Palestine Conciliation Commission to continue its efforts to make progress on the refugee question, was carried, with the addition of a preambular paragraph recalling Resolution 194 (III) of 1948 as Resolution 1856 (XVII) of 1962. At the Pledging Conference Her Majesty's Government, in pursuit of their aim of economies in relief, announced that a specific proportion of their 1963 contribution to the Agency would be earmarked for education. This had the effect of limiting the amount to be spent on relief.

23. In 1963 the Director-General reported that expenditure on relief had been held at the previous year's level but that expenditure on education and training had been greatly increased. The United States Delegation refused to accept a comparatively mild draft suggested by the Arabs, but were at first equally unable to obtain acceptance of their own draft by the Arabs and the Israelis. A resolution based on the original Arab draft was tabled by Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia, after the United States had lost a procedural wrangle over the precedence of their own draft, Israel then let it be known that the Netherlands, Denmark Iceland and Luxembourg had been persuaded to sponsor a resolution calling for direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, and that support was expected from African and Latin American countries. In the event the Arab and Israeli inspired resolutions were withdrawn and the United States draft was passed as Resolution 1912 (XVIII). At the Pledging Conference the United Kingdom specified that a further five per cent of the United Kingdom contribution should be devoted to education and training and the amount devoted to relief should be reduced accordingly.

24. In the Special circumstances of the Nineteenth Session the General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 2002 (XIX) of 15 February, 1965, which extended the UNRWA mandate to 30 June, 1966, without reference to a Committee and without debate. At the Pledging Conference called by the Ad Hoc. Committee on 17 February, 1965 the United Kingdom announced a contribution equivalent to \$5.4 million of which not more than

45% was to be allocated to relief, but pointed out that Britain could not be expected to continue indefinitely to provide money for relief to those who were not genuinely in need. The Palestine Conciliation Commission was not the subject of a debate and issued no report.

25. At the XXth General Assembly the Americans put forward a compromise draft Resolution to the Special Political Committee at an early stage. The Arabs and the Israelis then each proposed amendments to this draft. Just before these amendments were to be voted upon the Israelis withdrew theirs. The Arabs then withdrew the more obviously partisan of their amendments, but did not withdraw the others. This made it difficult to vote against the remaining Arab amendments without appearing to favour Israel unduly; and though the United Kingdom, the United States, the old Commonwealth and most of the Western European States voted against, the remaining Arab amendments were approved and incorporated in the Resolution accordingly adopted by the Special Political Committee. This Resolution had therefore a distinct pro-Arab flavour. An Arab-inspired Resolution about Arab refugee property in Israel was however rejected. The Arabs then came to consider the effect upon UNRWA of a Resolution against which all the major contributors had voted, and eventually accepted a compromise whereby the original American draft without the amendments tacked on in the Special Political Committee was adopted in Plenary.

26. For tactical reasons we agreed that Her Majesty's Government's contribution of \$5 million for 1966 might be increased by \$0.4 million payable with the second instalment of our contribution in August, 1966 if substantial progress had been made in achieving rectification of the ration rolls. This was not paid since no such progress was made. No conditions were made about the allocation of this money.

27. At the XXIst General Assembly the Americans again put forward at an early stage a compromise draft which, with drafting amendments proposed by Somalia, was adopted as Resolution 2154 (XXI) of 17 November, 1966. A draft Resolution (proposed by Afghanistan, Malaysia, Pakistan and Somalia) calling for the appointment of a United Nations Custodian of Arab property in Israel was rejected. At the 1966 Pledging Conference the United Kingdom representative announced that, because of Britain's current economic difficulties, Her Majesty's Government's contribution for 1967 would have to be reduced by \$0.5 million to \$4.5 million. He made it clear that 55% of the United Kingdom contribution was specifically allocated to UNRWA's education, training and health services, and that the remaining 45% might be used for the provision of relief.

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Section 4: Reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA
and the Secretary-General's Personal
Representative on refugees in the Middle East
(A/6797)

I. The UNRWA Commissioner-General's Draft Report.

28. The report is in three parts: the introduction deals with questions of policy; Part 1 reports on the activities of the Agency from 1 July, 1966 to 31 May, 1967; Part 2 is the budget for the calendar year 1968, which is compared with estimated expenditure during 1967. There is an annex on the legal aspects of the work of the Agency.

Introduction

Method of financing UNRWA

29. Even before the recent Arab-Israeli war, there was no solution in sight to UNRWA's basic dilemma, the ever-widening gap between resources and the needs of a growing number of registered refugees. Income continued to lag far behind the cost of essential services for the refugees and, after four successive years of deficit it seemed likely by the end of May that even if some hoped-for additional contributions were received, the 1967 budget would still be unbalanced by as much as \$4 million. This continuing financial crisis, which confronted the Agency with the harsh alternatives of progressively curtailing various services to the refugees or of risking an abrupt collapse when in a year or so's time its last remaining reserves ran out, had been discussed at two sessions of the Agency's Advisory Commission earlier in the year, and it had been intended to have another meeting about mid-year to consider the problem further (paragraphs 1-5).

30. In order to secure greater flexibility in the use of the Agency's dwindling assets, the Commissioner-General, with the approval of the Advisory Commission, presented to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions a proposed amendment of UNRWA's Financial Regulations which would give him wider latitude in treating governmental pledges announced, but not yet paid, as funds to meet future, long-term commitments and thus release cash which up to the present had been earmarked to meet such commitments. This has been agreed but it is clearly no more than a palliative, which does not affect UNRWA's basic financial predicament. (Paragraph 6).

31. The Commissioner-General feels bound to renew his appeal to put UNRWA on a sound financial basis. He does not consider it within his competence to make specific recommendations for changes in the method and basis of financing the Agency; but recalls the three suggestions put forward during the 21st session of the General Assembly:

- (a) that some method should be found by which the refugees would be enabled to benefit from the property which they left behind in 1948. It has been suggested that this would yield an annual sum considerably in excess of the income at UNRWA's disposal and that this sum could be applied to providing better services for the refugees and to

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rendering many of them independent of international assistance;

- (b) that the whole of the UNRWA budget should be transferred to the assessed budget of the United Nations and that all Member States would then contribute in accordance with the current scale of assessment;
- (c) that part of the Agency's budget, representing administrative expenses, should be transferred to the assessed budget, while operational services should continue to be financed by voluntary contributions. Depending on the definition of "administrative expenses" expenditure included in the Agency's administrative budget might vary from \$3.2 to \$4 million a year. If UNRWA were to receive additional revenue of this order, the effect would be to restore solvency to the Agency's present scale of "normal" operations at least for some years to come. If, however, the Governments already contributing to UNRWA were to reduce their voluntary contributions by the amount of their assessed share of the administrative budget, the relief to the Agency afforded by this proposal would be largely nullified. (Paragraphs 7-9).

Educational Services

32. A joint study of the educational problems of the refugees by UNRWA and the host governments showed that the Agency could usefully spend some \$10½ million on buildings and equipment and about \$7 million a year on recurrent operations over and above the \$16½ million which it is currently spending on its existing educational services. (Paragraphs 10-12).

Verification of need and eligibility of refugees

33. Relations between the Agency and the host governments are at their most delicate over the verification of need and eligibility for relief. Governments argue that such investigations would be resented by the refugees, would provoke violent reactions among them and a disturbance of public order. The Agency, on the other hand, is under pressure to eliminate the distribution of rations to those who do not need them. Relations with the host governments on this problem have been satisfactory except with Syria, which has imposed a virtually total ban on any investigations over ration rolls. There were difficulties over this in Jordan, but since the emergency of June-August it has been possible, with the co-operation of the Jordanian authorities more effectively to verify eligibility and eliminate abuses. (Paragraphs 13-23).

34. The aftermath of the recent war described (paragraphs 24-26); areas in which major hostilities took place (paragraphs 27-31); and in which no major hostilities took place (paragraphs 32-40). The emergency assistance given (paragraphs 41-45). Special contributions (paragraphs 46-47).

Progress in re-integration into host societies

35. In the long-term, the questions of repatriation and compensation are crucial: but this issue, despite repeated Resolutions by the Assembly, has remained in political deadlock.

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Meanwhile there has been considerable steady progress towards integrating the refugees into their host societies. Widespread assumptions that the refugees have been stagnating in idleness in the camps and that the host governments have deliberately kept the refugees in a state of dependence on international charity are refuted. The rehabilitation of the refugees has been promoted most effectively by the education and training which not only UNRWA, but also the host governments and various voluntary agencies have provided, and which has equipped the younger refugees to make a useful contribution to the host economies which have absorbed them as quickly as the pace of their own economic development would permit. (Paragraphs 48-52).

36. This gradual but hopeful process of economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees has now, for the time being at least, been halted and indeed reversed as a result of recent events. It is understood that some remedial action is already being taken by the Government of Israel to restimulate economic activity in Gaza and on the West Bank. But clearly if the refugees living in Gaza and on the West Bank remain cut off from opportunities of education, training and employment in the rest of the Arab World, this cannot but increase the difficulty of promoting their rehabilitation. In East Jordan, so long as the separation of the West Bank from the remainder of Jordan lasts, the whole process of rehabilitating the refugees on the East Bank, both those already living there before the hostilities and any of those displaced from the West Bank who may not be permitted or may not wish to return, will be gravely, perhaps irretrievably, set back. In Syria, too, for so long as the Palestinian refugees displaced from the south are not able to return to their former places of residence, they will be faced by many new difficulties in their struggle to recover economic independence, and their rehabilitation may be seriously retarded. If in fact the present state of affairs is prolonged, the international community may wish to consider what action it can take to promote economic recovery in the areas affected. As far as UNRWA is concerned, the Agency's most effective contribution would appear to be the maintenance of its existing services, possibly with some extension to new groups of displaced persons, coupled with an expansion of its programme of education and training for the children and young refugees. But not even the existing UNRWA services can be maintained, let alone extended or expanded, unless the chronic problem of financing the Agency is tackled with determination and realism. (Paragraphs 53 and 54).

The 1968 budget

37. The 1968 budget has, in the present circumstances, to involve much guess work. It is based on general assumptions that UNRWA's normal services will continue as they were before hostilities, and that UNRWA will continue in 1968 to supply shelter, rations and medical and educational services to certain numbers of those displaced as a result of the hostilities. These assumptions are set out in detail at paragraph 56. No provision is included for the expanded educational programme mentioned in Paragraph 12. To meet this budget, UNRWA needs \$41.6 million in contributions from Governments. The Commissioner-General appeals to the U.N. General Assembly to place the Agency on a sound financial basis. (Paragraphs 55-62).

Summary and conclusions.

38. The questions affecting UNRWA which seem to the Commissioner-General to require consideration and decision by the General Assembly are the following:

- (1) Is it desired that UNRWA should maintain its existing services during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities?
- (2) Is it desired that UNRWA should continue in 1968 giving help on a temporary and emergency basis to new groups of beneficiaries in urgent need?
- (3) Is it desired that UNRWA should seek to expand and improve its existing education and training services, particularly in those areas severely affected by the economic impact of recent events?
- (4) How is UNRWA to be provided with secure and adequate sources of funds to carry out whatever tasks may be assigned to it by the General Assembly?
- (5) If in fact adequate funds cannot be secured, will the General Assembly give the Commissioner-General guidance as to the action he should take to bring the Agency's expenditure and income into balance? Failing this, the harsh and highly political decisions as to which services must be reduced or eliminated fall upon the Commissioner-General and expose him to inevitable criticism. (Paragraph 63).

/PART I

PART I

39. This consists largely of a detailed report of the various services supplied by UNRWA. Since it is conveniently summarised in the tables at Annex I, no summary is given here. Annex I, however, does not bring out that there has been some progress in eliminating abuses of the ration system (paragraphs 4-6).

40. The summary of financial operations for 1966 and 1967 is set out in tabular form below. One feature of UNRWA's financial operations which causes the Commissioner-General anxiety is that for the fourth successive year the Agency incurred a deficit which in each case has had to be met by drawing on their working capital. Successive deficits have totalled \$6.2 million, and have reduced to only \$14.3 million the Agency's working capital which should be at least \$16 million at the beginning of the year if the Agency is to finance its "pipeline" of supplies and to provide funds for their operations during the first half of the year.

PART II

41. The 1968 budget is summarised in the Table in paragraph 94 (and explained in detail in paragraphs 99-132). The budgeted cost of the Agency's normal programme, \$40.15 million, exceeds the estimated 1967 cost by \$1.12 million. Higher prices and the necessity to provide for a larger school population are the major factors in causing this increase. The budget also provides \$5.68 million for possible increased activities arising from the hostilities and their aftermath. It is emphasised that, in the nature of the unresolved situation, there are only provisional estimates and that actual requirements could prove to be much higher. (paragraphs 88-98).

42. If this budget is to be covered, UNRWA expect to need contributions from Governments totalling \$41.6 million, \$38.6 million of which would be for the normal programme and \$3.0 million for the expanded programme. Since working capital at the beginning of 1968 is expected to be as low as \$11.5 million, they would not wish to draw on this. (paragraphs 134-137).

Annex I

43. Annex I gives in tabular form information about UNRWA's various services.

Annex II

44. There would be advantage in renewing attempts to secure a standard basic agreement with host States to govern and facilitate UNRWA's operations (paragraphs 1-4). Such an agreement might cover taxes, customs duties, restrictions on imports (paragraph 5) Status of Staff, independence and immunity of locally engaged staff in respect of their official duties (paragraphs 6 and 7) and freedom of movement of staff (paragraphs 8 and 9).

45. The Agency intends to represent certain long standing claims against the Governments of Jordan, Syria and the U.A.R. (details of which are given in paragraphs 11-20). They are also conducting a comprehensive loss survey on the basis of which they will formulate claims for losses or damage arising out of the recent hostilities. (paragraph 10).

Line to take (see also paragraphs 80-91 below)

46. The delegation should welcome the report in general terms, paying tribute to the resource and humanity with which UNRWA, while maintaining their services to the refugees who came within the scope of their Mandate, also readily undertook emergency relief work to cope with the movement of refugees in the wake of the recent hostilities. The delegation should also welcome the report of progress towards eliminating the distribution of rations to those who do not need them.

47. In discussion of the questions posed in paragraph 63 of the Commissioner-General's annual report (see paragraph 38 above) the delegation should be guided in general by paragraphs 83 to 88 of Section 5 of this brief and should take the line set out in paragraphs 89-91 below.

48. On the Commissioner-General's first question they could state that in addition to the obvious humanitarian reasons why UNRWA should maintain its "normal programme" during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities, there is the strong political reason that the withdrawal of UNRWA services would dangerously disturb the present tenuous equilibrium in the Middle East, and would militate strongly against the international community's efforts to find a settlement to the Middle East crisis, and the general long-term international interest in peace and stability in the area.

49. The same arguments would apply mutatis mutandis in favour of continuation of UNRWA's "expanded programme" for the new refugees. Should the "new refugees" remain displaced longer than the period for which the \$2.7 million which UNRWA has in hand can provide the necessary emergency services, we should consider, in the light of the refugee and general political situation at the time, what further contribution the United Kingdom should make to UNRWA's expenditure on temporary relief services. In the meantime, however, we shall continue to press on the governments concerned the urgent need to enable those who were displaced during and after the recent hostilities to return to their homes, where most of them would again become self-supporting. In any discussion on this point Israel is likely to come under fire for having obstructed this return, and though we should not initiate criticism of Israel, the delegation should not dissociate themselves from any criticisms based on humanitarian grounds.

50. On the Commissioner-General's third question the delegation should take the line that though it would be desirable to expand and improve UNRWA's existing education and training services, this would not be practicable unless governmental subscriptions for 1968 exceeded \$41.6 million which the Agency estimates would be necessary to finance the normal programme and the expanded programme.

51. We attach the highest value to UNRWA's educational and training services, since they equip the refugees to stand on their own feet and enable them to make a useful contribution to their host societies. But since it is unlikely that governmental contributions will exceed the amount needed to finance current UNRWA services, any expansion of the training and educational services could only be financed by reducing other services. The delegation should not support any large reduction in relief services since this would be likely to incur the Arab charge that our real aim was to liquidate the refugee problem by denying the refugees essential rations and that without the food to keep the refugees alive, schools were useless. Although these charges could be answered by reference to the fact that rations are distributed to many refugees who are not in need of them, and that economies effected by restricting distribution of rations to those in need could help to finance more forward looking programmes, the delegation should avoid a position in which they would need to deploy these arguments since they would be likely to be counter-productive in the present context of heightened Arab susceptibilities.

52. On the Commissioner-General's fifth question, our criterion for settling priorities in reductions of UNRWA's services is that those services should be reduced last which make the greatest contribution towards integration of the refugees into the economic life of the region. The delegation should be guided by the statement at paragraph 88 of Section 5 of our priorities for reductions of UNRWA services.

53. The line to take on the Commissioner-General's fourth question will be given in separate correspondence with the United Kingdom Mission New York.

/II. The Report

UNRWA : SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS FOR 1966 AND 1967

	<u>1966</u>		<u>1967</u>		
	<u>Millions of U.S. Dollars</u>		<u>Normal programme</u>	<u>Expanded programme</u>	
			<u>Total</u>		
			<u>(Millions of U.S. dollars)</u>		
Working capital (operating reserve) at 1 January	15.3		<u>14.3</u>	-	<u>14.3</u>
Income for year:					
Pledges by Governments	35.0		34.0	5.7	39.7
Other contributions	0.8		1.0	0.7	1.7
Other income and exchange adjustments	<u>0.5</u>		<u>1.3</u>	-	<u>1.3</u>
Total income	<u>36.3</u>		<u>36.3</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>42.7</u>
Expenditure and commitments for year:-					
Relief services	17.3		17.5	2.2	19.7
Health services	5.0		5.1	0.1	5.2
Educational services	15.2		16.5	0.3	16.8
Increased Unit costs	-		-	0.3	0.3
Losses due to hostilities	<u>-</u>		<u>-</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Total, expenditure and commitments	<u>37.5</u>		<u>39.1</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>42.8</u>
Excess of expenditure and commitments over Income (deficit)	<u>(1.2)</u>		<u>(2.8)</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>(0.1)</u>
Working capital (operating reserve) at 31 December before adjustments and transfers	14.1		<u>11.5</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>14.2</u>
<u>Add:</u>					
Net adjustments of prior years' accounts	<u>0.2</u>				
Adjusted working capital (operating reserve) at 31 December	<u>14.3</u>				

II. The Report of the Secretary-General's
Personal Representative

A. Conditions in Israel occupied areas

Syria

54. Out of a pre-war population of 115,000 (according to the Syrians) or 90,000 (according to the Israelis) only 6,250 of the indigenous population remained in Israeli occupied Syria, of whom 6,000 are Druzes. The Special Representative did not find any evidence that this great exodus had come about through Israeli coercion. But though he concluded that, as the Israelis claimed, the greater part of it took place after the ending of hostilities, the Israelis had been far from reluctant to see the Syrians leave. They had done nothing whatever to reassure the population of the area, and there was no evidence for their assertion that the Syrians had encouraged their own citizens to leave. (paragraphs 1-30).

Looting

55. The Syrians asserted and the Israelis emphatically denied that there had been large scale looting in the areas of Syria taken by Israeli troops. On the whole the Special Representative inclined more to the Syrian than to the Israel accounts, but did not suggest that looting was ever in any way officially organised or condoned. He found that a number of Israeli soldiers had been imprisoned for looting offences on account of it. (paragraphs 31-34)

Demolition of villages

56. The Special Representative was satisfied that the great destruction he observed in some villages had been due generally to military operations or necessities and found no evidence of gratuitous demolition. (paragraphs 35-44)

Jordan

Efforts to expel the population

57. Again the Special Representative exonerates Israel of the charge of having used physical compulsion to expel residents of the West Bank across the river. On the other hand he was impressed by persistent reports of intimidation by Israeli armed forces and of Israel announcements to the population that they might be better off on the East Bank. They also provided trucks and buses for those who wished to leave for the East Bank. (paragraphs 45-50)

Destruction of Villages

58. The same pattern appeared here as in Syria, except that in addition to destruction during the course of the fighting and demolitions for strategic reasons, the Israelis appear to have made a point of blowing up houses which had

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harboured snipers, or villages which they had reason to suppose had at some time harboured El Fatah gangs. The Special Representative was unable to form an exact opinion of the number of people made homeless by these demolitions. (paragraphs 51-72)

Looting

59. There were many Jordanian reports of Israeli looting of the Banks: the Israelis reported that nothing was taken except against duly signed receipts. Certain hospital equipment was looted at Qalquilya. (paragraphs (73-77)

Economic social conditions and needs

60. As a result of the hostilities the economy of the West Bank had come to a standstill: the market for West Bank produce on the East Bank and in Kuwait had been cut off; banks were closed and credit facilities withdrawn. Thus, while, due considerably to Israel Government initiative, there is a sufficient supply of food, there is too little currency available with which to buy it. The Israeli Government assured the Special Representative, however, that it was taking measures to restart the West Bank's economy by integrating it with that of Israel proper. At the same time the Israelis were willing to allow the continuation of remittances to West Bank residents from Arab countries, though negotiations with Jordan over this, and over the exchange rate for the Dinar, had broken down. (paragraphs 78-92)

61. The Special Representative nevertheless feared that the standard of life of the West Bankers might undergo a net - if temporary - decline and urged the need to continue emergency relief to the new refugees.

United Arab Republic

62. The Gaza Strip suffered from the same problems of rising prices combined with shortage of money which beset the West Bank. However, the situation here is more serious in that the three staples of the economy have been removed at a blow: the export of citrus fruits, the salaries of U.A.R. Government employees and the remittances to residents from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. There is thus at the moment large scale unemployment in the Gaza area. Similarly El Arish was now deprived of the salaries of the 4,000 heads of families who had previously been employed by the U.A.R. Government (paragraphs 93-135)

B. Situation of displaced persons

63. 350,000 fled from areas of Israel occupation as a result of the recent war as follows:

- (a) 200,000 moved from the West Bank to the East Bank in Jordan (93,500 of these persons were refugees registered with UNRWA);

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- (b) 110,000 (85,000 according to Israeli sources) moved out of Israeli occupied Syria (of these 17,000 were UNRWA registered refugees); and
- (c) 35,000 moved across the Suez Canal (of these 3,000 were UNRWA registered refugees).

Immediately after the end of hostilities emergency assistance was organized for these displaced persons by international, national and private bodies. Syria received least of this assistance in proportion to number of refugees. (paragraphs 136-158)

64. In both Syria and Jordan the most urgent problem was that of providing shelter. In Syria 80% of the refugees were housed in schools which would have to be vacated before the beginning of the school year. In Jordan they were accommodated in temporary refugee camps set up during the hostilities which were totally unsuitable for continued occupation. In both cases something would have to be done before the onset of winter in providing adequate new shelter and blankets and warm clothing. In Egypt the problem was only slightly less urgent: 10,000 refugees were at present accommodated in Liberation Province in villages that were intended to house new agricultural communities at the beginning of the new agricultural season. (paragraphs 159-176 and 200-202)

C. Return of displaced persons

65. The Syrian Government strongly desired the return of displaced Syrians. However, like the Egyptians, they were unwilling to enter into the direct negotiations with Israel on which the latter insisted. The refugees themselves in Syria were divided in their views, some being willing to return to their homes whether Israel continued to control the area or not, others insisting on a prior Israeli withdrawal. In Egypt the refugees seemed more prepared to return at any price, and the Governor of Liberation Province said that they had refused his offer of free plots of land preferring to await their return to their homes. (paragraphs 177-184)

66. Direct negotiations did take place with Jordan and after considerable difficulties the return of refugees to the East Bank took place between 18 and 31 August. The Jordan authorities claim that by that time the Israeli Government had received 40,000 applications, involving a 170,000 persons of which, by 28 August they had approved only 4,763 covering 16,266 persons. By 9 September the total number of returned refugees was given by Jordan as 14,150 and by Israel as 14,056. The Israeli Government later claimed that the Jordanian authorities had never made full use of the permits issued, that only 60% of the displaced persons who had been authorized to return appeared and that they had opened two bridges across the Jordan to receive returnees at the rate of 3,000 a day. (paragraphs 185-191)

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67. Conversely, the Jordanians complained that the Israelis had approved only a fraction of the applications submitted and that the procedure they insisted upon had deliberately impeded the operation, that only 12 hours notice was given to locate refugees and transport them to the crossing points and that the lists received contained refugees accommodated in several localities and camps. Moreover, the Israelis had approved the return of some members of a family while denying the application of other members, and did not allow the refugees to bring with them all their personal possessions. (paragraph 192)

68. The Special Representative concluded that the Israelis must bear the major responsibility for the small proportion of eligible refugees who have returned as well as for the small fraction of applications that had been approved in the first place. Even if the potential daily rate of 3,000 a day had been reached between 18 and 31 August, only 35,000 refugees would have returned. Moreover the time limit made no allowances for the great logistic and administrative problems involved. However on 11 September the Permanent Representative of Israel at the United Nations did state his Government's agreement to the return after the 31 August deadline, of special categories of refugees, including split families, amounting according to Israeli estimates to 6,602 persons and according to Jordanian 4,086 persons. (paragraphs 193-199)

D. Treatment of Prisoners of War

69. Though he was not in a position to investigate atrocities alleged to have been committed during and immediately after the fighting the Special Representative was satisfied that the treatment of prisoners of war was, at the moment, quite correct. (paragraphs 203-209)

E. Treatment of Minorities

70. There had been no discrimination against the Jewish minority in Syria and that Jewish shops in Damascus appeared to be working normally. The Israeli Government informed the Special Representative that there had been no discrimination against the Arab population in Israel and that none were in political detention. The United Arab Republic Government on the other hand informed him that Jews of Egyptian nationality were their sole responsibility and he was unable to check personally the allegations that 500 to 600 Jewish men in Egypt (out of a minority community of 2,500) had been kept in detention since the beginning of the war and that the property of Jews in Cairo had been confiscated. (paragraphs 210-221)

Line to take

71. The delegation should welcome the Secretary-General's appeal (224) that the Governments concerned should divorce the purely humanitarian aspects of the Middle East situation from the political and military aspects and deal with them separately. Her Majesty's Government continue to assert that it is urgent that those who were displaced during and since the hostilities should be permitted to return to their homes and, in particular,

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that UNRWA registered refugees who were newly-displaced should be allowed before the winter to return to the camps in West Bank Jordan which they vacated. Should there be criticism of Israel on this score, the delegation should be guided by paragraph 49 of Section 4 of this brief.

Section 5: Policy

Seating of Representatives of the Refugees

72. It has become traditional for the Special Political Committee to hear spokesmen for the Arab Refugees. The delegations of Arab States invariably ask that they should be heard as "the Palestine Delegation", or some similar phrase. They will probably come this year from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) headed by Ahmad Shuqairy, to which the Arab States accord the status of an "entity" though not of a government. We regard this Organisation as likely to increase tension in the area and are anxious that it should not receive international recognition. The United States and Israel Governments share this view. (The Israel Foreign Minister emphasised in a meeting with the Minister of State in February the importance Israel attached to the PLO's receiving no recognition. He was assured that Her Majesty's Government would never accord it recognition in any way.)

Line to take

73. In consultation with the United States Delegation, the Delegation should seek, by lobbying the Chairman in advance, to make sure that the status of any spokesman for the refugees is not defined by the Committee and that nothing is said or done to accord them the status of governmental or quasi-governmental representatives, or to accord any recognition to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The Committee should follow the precedent set by the Chairman's decision last year to allow PLO spokesmen to be heard, but specifically to deny recognition to the Organisation.

The Arab/Israel Dispute

74. In previous years the debate has covered a wide number of topics not directly concerned with the refugees. Since there is this year a separate item on the Middle East on the agenda, the Delegation should, if opportunity offers, endeavour to keep discussion of the refugee problem to the point. For the line to take as necessary on these other subjects, see general brief on the Middle East situation.

The Palestine Conciliation Commission

75. Although the Commission has completed its project for the identification and evaluation of the property of the refugees, it has not undertaken any initiatives during the past year for a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute and no early moves seem likely. It has not yet published a report. The Commission may not therefore feature much in the

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debate. The Arabs may revive proposals for enlarging the Commission to add Afro-Asian members. The Arabs may revive proposals for a United Nations Custodian of Arab property in Israel.

Line to take

76. The Delegation should keep in touch with the United States Delegation. They should support and vote for any resolution providing for the continuation of the Conciliation Commission's activities in acceptable terms. This could be on the lines of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Resolution 192 (XVIII).

77. The Americans may wish to exclude a reference to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) from the operative clauses of any resolution in view of the Israel opposition and consequent controversy which such a reference could arouse. The Delegation has discretion to assist them in lobbying on this question if they so request but in view of the numerous precedents for such a reference we do not ourselves regard it as particularly undesirable.

78. If proposals for an amendment of the composition of the Commission are canvassed the Delegation should keep in touch with the United States, French and Turkish Delegations and seek instructions. We shall have to be guided primarily by the views of our allies and by the need to avoid giving an opening to the Soviet bloc. We do not rule out all possibility of accepting the reconstitution of the Commission provided that the United States remains a member, but since the Israelis are opposed to any change, initiatives in this sense could only come from the Arabs with the aim of installing their partisans on the Commission. This would not help it in its task and any change is probably therefore undesirable. The State Department are opposed to it.

79. If the Arabs press for the appointment of a United Nations Custodian of former refugee property in Israel the Delegation should work against this. We share with the Americans the view:

- (a) that it is doubtful whether the refugees still have a valid legal claim to property in Israel;
- (b) that the appointment of a United Nations Custodian would infringe Israel sovereignty, (an Israel Custodian has been in office since 1948); and
- (c) that the Arabs, knowing Israel is bound to reject any reference to property rights or a Custodian, wish to press the point in order to place on the Israelis and on us the blame for non-compliance with a United Nations Resolution.

The Delegation should draw on (b) and (c) only if pressed; we are particularly anxious to avoid saying anything on point (a).

UNRWA

80. In the absence of any progress towards a general settlement in the Middle East, it is still not possible to foresee

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the shape or size of the refugee problem with which UNRWA will have to deal in the future. But until there is a general settlement, including a solution of the refugee problem, we are likely to continue to have political, as well as humanitarian reasons for supporting UNRWA. By relieving the distress of the refugees, UNRWA lessens the danger that they will contribute to a heightening of tension in the Arab/Israel dispute.

81. For as long as UNRWA has to continue with its humanitarian programme, Her Majesty's Government would expect to continue to make a substantial contribution to the Agency's budget. But the precise level of our contribution in 1968 may well be determined by political developments, by the degree to which new initiatives to solve the refugee problem become propitious and by the number of "new refugees" who return to West Bank Jordan where they have their homes or where UNRWA has at present unused facilities to care for them.

82. Apart from maintaining and re-establishing its services (in conditions of post-war dislocation) to those refugees who come under terms of the UNRWA Mandate, the Agency has extended its services also to those who became refugees as a result of the recent hostilities. Throughout the period since the outbreak of hostilities, we have impressed upon the Israel Government the importance of avoiding acts which would encourage any exodus of the inhabitants of occupied territories and the importance of making humane arrangements for the return to their homes or camps of those who had fled. It is disappointing that the arrangements made for the return of the "new" refugees proved so short-lived and no more than a small proportion of those who wished to return were, in the event able to do so. It is our hope however that it will be possible for the Israel Government to adopt a more accommodating stand on this question and thus relieve UNRWA of the additional burden of caring for refugees not covered by its Mandate. In addition to our normal annual contribution to UNRWA's Budget of \$4.5 million for 1966, we contributed \$500,000 towards the cost of emergency relief provided by UNRWA for these "new refugees".

83. Since we must expect some considerable time to elapse before a general settlement is achieved, we must consider some of UNRWA's perennial problems which may be expected to recur during this period.

84. During the last few years we have become increasingly concerned at the rising cost of UNRWA's work. We have had confidence in the Commissioner-General and his staff, and have supported the policy whereby the Agency attempts to assist the refugees to become self-supporting by spending a considerable proportion of its revenue on the provision of health services, and education and vocational training. The relief work of the Agency is justified where there is genuine need, and we accept that it will have to continue; but too many refugees have been in receipt of rations when they did not need them. We believe that the administration of the relief programme could and should be reformed to ensure that relief goes in appropriate amounts only to those who need it. This could only be done with the active cooperation of the host Governments, and the Commissioner-General's past efforts to obtain this cooperation without financial pressure have been unsuccessful. In Britain's

/financial

financial situation we cannot be expected indefinitely to provide money for rations for those who do not need them.

85. It was for this reason that we reduced our annual contribution for 1966 from \$5.4 to \$5 million. The United Kingdom's own financial situation made it necessary for us to reduce our contribution for 1967 by a further \$0.5 million to \$4.5 million. Although we do not rule out for 1968 contributions towards emergency relief measures, or towards any new initiative towards a solution of the refugee problem, we have no reason at present for raising our annual contribution for 1968 to UNRWA's ordinary Budget from its 1967 level of \$4.5 million. Our balance of payments situation has not sufficiently improved to justify restoration of the reduction of \$0.5 million made in 1967. There has been no progress towards rectification of the ration rolls sufficient to justify restoration of the \$0.4 million reduction which we made in 1966. However, the exact extent of UNRWA's commitments after the new Arab/Israel war is still uncertain, and we cannot altogether exclude that there might not be convincing reasons for increasing our annual contribution.

86. But if we assume a reversion to the conditions prevailing before 5 June, we do not believe that the host Governments, whatever they may say in public, or in private, will ever willingly consent to cooperate in a thorough rectification of the ration rolls. It is in their interest to exaggerate the size of the refugee problem, which is a central part of their case against Israel, and to submit to pressure from refugees not in need that they should retain their rations. As matters stand at present, the needy refugees are adequately looked after by UNRWA. Those not in need were estimated at 10-20 per cent of those in receipt of basic rations by the Commissioner General in paragraph 12 of his 1963/64 report. An American estimate puts this figure at 25 per cent and it may be higher. Basic rations cost \$12 million in 1964 so there is obviously scope for economy. The fact that there are children waiting to get on the rolls emphasises the need to do something about this. We regard it as the Commissioner-General's job to try to bring this home to the host Governments. Any move to withdraw ration cards from this undeserving section of the refugee population would be unpopular, and as the host Governments see it, unnecessary unless there is a prospect that cuts will have to be imposed on all the UNRWA services, which would be unpopular with all the refugees. We cannot accept a continuing commitment to maintain our contribution at current levels, which would encourage the Arabs in their determination artificially to prolong the existence of the problem, although we cannot give this reason publicly.

87. We may well be accused of attempting to liquidate the refugee problem in advance of a just and agreed solution. Such accusations do not bear examination and there is no reason for us to be apologetic over our record over UNRWA. Over the years we will have contributed more than \$100 million by the end of 1967. This represents 14 per cent of the Agency's total expenditure and is more than the total contributed by all other Governments excluding the United States. Even after the cut Her Majesty's Government will still be by far the second largest contributor. Our financial difficulties make it essential for us to look very carefully at overseas expenditure,

/and

and the fact that we have made such a comparatively small cut demonstrates the importance we attach to UNRWA's work.

88. In discussing the need for the Commissioner-General to cut his services in accordance with the finance available the delegation should bear in mind that we should prefer to see reductions in UNRWA's relief services, rather than in the health services and in the educational and vocational services which fit the refugees to stand on their own feet. It will be difficult to do more than make this point without laying ourselves open to further charges that our real aim is to liquidate the refugee problem by denying them essential rations and that without food to keep the refugees alive, schools are futile. The answer to this must be that the ration rolls contain wage-earners who do not need rations. We should regard a straight percentage cut of all UNRWA services as less desirable. The least desirable outcome would be a concentration of expenditure cuts on education and training. It might be possible to give some effect to these preferences by tying a proportion of our contributions, but no decision on this has yet been made.

Line to take (see also paragraphs 46-53 above)

89. We have no strong views on how the debate in the Special Political Committee should be tackled. The delegation should keep in close touch with the Americans.

90. In speaking about the operations of the Agency the delegation should take the line that Her Majesty's Government have confidence in the Commissioner-General and his staff and admire the resource and humanity with which they have tackled the formidable problems posed. But the affairs of the Agency have not gone as well in the past as could have been hoped, because of a lack of cooperation between the host Governments and the Agency. This cooperation must be pressed forward so that the Agency can operate as efficiently as possible in the interests of the refugees. The United Kingdom has repeatedly stressed its anxiety that the resources of the Agency should be confined to the assistance of those in need. It is generally accepted that, as the Commissioner-General recognises, greater equity in the administration of the funds available is required for this purpose and that a proportion of the refugees at present in receipt of rations do not need them. It is here that cuts can be made in expenditure. The Commissioner-General and the host Governments must have regard to what the international community can provide by way of funds for the continuance of the Agency's work.

91. Any resolution should aim at a clause directing that expenditure should match income and appealing to member Governments for increased contributions. In the present political atmosphere we should not be associated with any resolution explicitly calling for a reduction of UNRWA expenditure on relief.

Third Generation Refugees

92. The Israelis may urge publicly that no rations be given to the grandchildren of refugees. The Americans hope to avoid

/any

any reference to this problem. We share the Israel view that the grant of rations to such children threatens to perpetuate the refugee problem, and are more keen than the Americans that this point should be brought home to the Commissioner-General. We see no likelihood however that any resolution would refer to this problem in acceptable terms and in the present state of Anglo-Arab relations would not wish openly to be associated with any such move.

The Pledging Conference

Line to take

93. It is anticipated that the British contribution for the calendar year 1968 will, be not more than \$4.5 million, its 1967 level. We have not yet decided whether any specific proportion should be allocated only to health services, education and training.

94. The delegation should explain that we will decide on the level of our 1968 contribution to UNRWA in the light of the situation and any new initiatives towards a general settlement including a solution of the refugee problem. In the absence of any developments our contribution to UNRWA's ordinary annual budget will not exceed \$4.5 million, its 1967 level.

95. The delegation should not speak at the Pledging Conference without further instructions, which will be sent when the level of our contribution has been determined. Subject to these instructions, they should speak on the following lines, modified as necessary by the terms of any resolution which has been passed. When announcing our contribution they should point out that Britain has borne a very creditable share of UNRWA costs. Britain's present financial position dictates a need for economy in all overseas Governmental expenditure. We attach such importance however to UNRWA that despite our difficulties we are continuing to make an annual contribution not significantly smaller than we made when we had less reason to economise on overseas expenditure. This will no doubt still leave Britain by far the second largest contributor. We hope that other countries which have the means to do so will increase their share in the financing of UNRWA.

(19)

STANDING CONFERENCE OF
BRITISH ORGANISATIONS FOR AID TO REFUGEES


(IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SOCIAL SERVICE)

26 BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.1

TELEPHONE
MUSEUM 4066

SECRETARY
MISS N. RICE-JONES

CHAIRMAN
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN



DAP


26th August 1968

Dear Mr. Daly,

Further to our telephone conversation last week, I am now enclosing a copy of a letter I received from UNRWA, Beirut this morning about their priority needs.

I hope this information is of use to you, and would be very grateful if you decide that you can do anything, if you could let us know.

Yours sincerely,



Miss D.A. Penfold
Secretary to Miss Rice-Jones.

Michael Daly, Esq.,
Foreign Office
King Charles Street
London S.W.1.

UNITED NATIONS
Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees

UNRWA Headquarters,
Museitbeh Quarter,
Beirut, Lebanon.

22nd August 1968

Dear Miss Rice-Jones,

Thank you for your letter of 1 August concerning the article attacking UNRWA, which was published in the London Evening Standard on 10 May.

It is very kind of the Committee to take such an interest in refuting statements in this article, but I am doubtful whether anything would now be published.

A letter from Mr. Bennett of OXFAM on the subject was published on 23 May, while my own letter dated 23 May did not appear, presumably because the subject was no longer of interest to the newspaper.

I am attaching a copy of my 23 May letter to the Editor so that you will see the lines on which I attempted to refute Mrs. Mostyn-Owen's allegations. If the Committee felt that it would be worthwhile pursuing this any further, I would be glad to help.

We are all sad that Mr. Reddaway has left, but he retains his deep interest in the refugee problem and our loss may be the gain of organisations in the United Kingdom. No successor has yet been appointed, but an announcement will be made in due course.

As for our most urgent needs, you will be now have received my cable of 19 August, advising you that we would be particularly interested in receiving contributions towards the current operating costs of the emergency health programme in Marka, Souf and Jerash tented camps. Details of the project with cost estimates are attached.* Any contributions which the Standing Conference would make would be deeply appreciated.

It may interest you to know that, in respect of the other three emergency camps, the Swedish Save the Children Federation have contributed funds for a similar project in Baqa'a emergency camp; the French Red Cross Society have agreed to fund the medical services in Huson, and the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society have a medical team in Zizia.

It was most kind of you to suggest that I should call in and see you when next in England. I hope to be in London in October and will make a point of getting in touch.

With kindest regards.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN F. DEFRATES
Chief
Public Information Office

*You will notice we have increased the cost estimate for Marka Camp, as given in my cable, by a further \$1,050.

COSTS OF ANNUAL OPERATION OF
GENERAL CLINICS, MATERNAL AND CHILD
HEALTH SERVICES IN TENTED
CAMPS, EAST JORDAN

In order to provide medical care for and minimise the possibility of serious outbreaks of disease among the refugees, it has been necessary to provide emergency health facilities in the tented camps sheltering displaced persons. The basic needs comprise a temporary health centre and provision of a medical officer, nurses, auxiliary personnel, medicines and operational supplies.

1. The estimated annual operating costs of the emergency health services in Marka tented camp, east Jordan, with its present population of approximately 13,000 persons, are:

(A) Staff costs for medical officer, nurses, midwife and other personnel	\$16,868	
(B) Medical Supplies	2,300	
(C) Layettees for the newborn	537	
(D) Miscellaneous expenses	700	
	<hr/>	
	\$20,405	\$20,405

2. The estimated costs for the provision of similar services in Souf Emergency Camp, near Jerash, with its present population of 8,000, are:

(A) Staff costs for medical officer, nurses, midwife and other personnel	\$13,219	
(B) Medical Supplies	975	
(C) Layettees for newborn infants	351	

(B) Miscellaneous expenses	600	
	<u> </u>	
	\$15,145	\$15,145

3. The estimated costs for the provision of similar services in Jerash Emergency Camp, east Jordan, with its present population of 11,000, are:

(A) Staff costs for medical officer, nurses, midwife and other personnel	\$16,418	
(B) Medical Supplies	1,927	
(C) Layettees for newborn infants	455	
(D) Miscellaneous expenses	700	
	<u> </u>	
	\$19,500	\$19,500
		<u> </u>
		\$55,050
		<u> </u>

August 1968

RESTRICTED

18/1



Mr. Daly: 18/18

Assm 15/8

British Embassy,

PA Assm.

BEIRUT

13th August, 1968.

(18) 28/8

Dear Chris,

Palestinian Refugees

A conference of countries acting as hosts to Palestinian refugees was held in Beirut from 6 - 8 August under the auspices of the Arab League.

2. The conference, which was chaired by the Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League, Sayed Nofal, was attended by delegations from Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the U.A.R. and the P.L.O. The agenda was said to include discussion of Israeli attempts to evict Arabs from the occupied territories, the status of U.N.W.R.A., and the conditions of Arab refugees following the June war.

3. At the end of the conference it was announced that the resolutions taken were secret and would be referred to the Arab League meeting of Foreign Ministers in Cairo next month.

4. It was also officially reported that the Commissioner General of U.N.W.R.A., Michelmore, attended the conference and that his report for the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly was discussed. However, the U.N.W.R.A. legal adviser, Bowat, told me that there was no truth in this report. He accompanied Michelmore to meet the delegates at their request on 9 August. The visit was mostly confined to an exchange of courtesies and the only matter of substance was consideration of an Arab request to postpone the next meeting of the Advising Committee of U.N.W.R.A., due to be held later this month, until after the Arab League meeting. Michelmore did not agree to this, but did agree to delay the meeting another week, until 26 August.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Egerton in New York and Chanceries at Amman and Cairo.

Yours ever,

Stephen Armitage

(H. St. J. B. Armitage)

A. C. D. S. MacRae, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

P.S. The opening of the conference was postponed from 5 to 6 August because the Syrian delegation were delayed. The reason given in the press was that the Palestinian driver of the delegation was refused permission to enter Lebanon because he did not have the special entry permit which is obligatory for refugees.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No 15
27 MAY 1968
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~~E2/47~~ E18/19

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(17)

CYPHER:CAT 'A'

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1392

25 MAY 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1392 OF 25 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV AND
WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO JEDDA AND KHARTOUM.

FOR DEPARTMENTS FIRST THING MONDAY MORNING.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1390. (163) E2/47.

ARAB REFUGEES.

DURING MY TALK WITH JARRING THIS MORNING, I ASKED HIM,
SPEAKING PERSONALLY, WHETHER HE DID NOT THINK SOME BASIC STUDIES
(PERHAPS NO MORE THAN PRELIMINARY FACT FINDING) MIGHT BE PUT IN
HAND ON SOME OF THE MAIN ISSUES FOR SETTLEMENT (EG. REFUGEES,
BOUNDARIES, JERUSALM, DEMILITARIZATION) WHICH COULD PROVIDE A BASIS
FOR FUTURE ACTION WHEN PROGRESS MIGHT BE FASTER.

2. JARRING REPLIED THAT HE HAD GIVEN A LOT OF THOUGHT TO THE IDEA.
HE REMEMBERED THAT I HAD MENTIONED TO HIM SEPARATE TREATMENT OF
THE REFUGEE QUESTION WHEN WE FIRST MET LAST DECEMBER. HE MIGHT BE
ABLE TO SAY SOMETHING MORE ABOUT THIS SOON. THERE WAS NO
PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY IN GETTING DETAILED ADVICE ON MILITARY
SUBJECTS (EG. FRONTIER ADJUSTMENT AND DEMILITARIZATION) SINCE
GENERAL BULL WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THE DANGERS OF
LEAKAGE IF IT BECAME KNOWN THAT WORK ON SUCH STUDIES WAS IN
HAND, WERE CONSIDERABLE.

3. JARRING'S COMMENT ON REFUGEES IN THE ABOVE CONTEXT IS
INTERESTING. I THINK HE MAY BE STUDYING WITH THE SECRETARIAT
DETAILED IDEAS ON THE LONG TERM ASPECTS OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.
FO PASS AMMAN NO. 196, BEIRUT NO. 168, CAIRO NO. 210,
AND TEL AVIV NO. 214 AND SAVING TO JEDDA NO. 84 AND KHARTOUM NO. 37.
LORD CARADON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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S.A.D.
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for
MD VI.VI.



pm
M 10/6
16

UNCLASSIFIED

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY

A.B.Urwick

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MAY 9/68
"We Will Go Back," Arab Refugees in
Jordan Vow
(by Drew Middleton)

Cc: Chancery, Amman

WASHINGTON, D.C.

9 May 1968

E 18/19

Eastern Department
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

UNCLASSIFIED

pm

16/2.
u/c.

Eastern Dept.
Mr. Dany


Jan
5. v



Pw. MS 3/5

With the compliments of

ref your letter of 8 April.
(~~LR 2/18~~).



BRITISH EMBASSY

BEIRUT

29-4-68.

1872 (15)

UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES



NATIONS UNIES
OFFICE DE SECOURS ET DE TRAVAUX
POUR LES REFUGIES DE PALESTINE

Headquarters, Beirut, Lebanon - Cables: UNRWA

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL

Ch...
Mr. Sanders
with 26/4

24 April 1968

Dear Mr. King,

It was kind of you to send me the extract from Hansard enclosed in your letter of 19 April and I have read with appreciation this expression of sympathy and concern in the British Parliament about the present condition of the refugees in Jordan.

I would like to take this opportunity of expressing to you my appreciation for the action of the United Kingdom Government in increasing the sterling value of its regular contribution to UNRWA for 1968 so as to maintain, at the new rate of exchange, the same level of contribution as before. I should be grateful if you will convey to your Government my sincere appreciation.

I note that Mr. Moyle enquired "whether any suggestions had been made to the Arab Governments that adequate weatherproof camps should be established on the uplands away from the flashpoint of the Jordan Valley". As you are aware, all the refugee camps on the East Bank of the Jordan Valley are now empty and six new camps, which UNRWA is administering, have in fact been established on the uplands. The refugees living in these camps are accommodated in tents and the Jordan Government is not, I understand, at present favourably disposed to the erection by UNRWA of more solid shelter for the persons displaced from the West Bank. However, this matter is under constant review and discussion between the authorities in Jordan and the Agency, and a number of more solid structures are now being erected in the new tented camps to serve communal purposes such as schoolrooms, clinics and distribution centres.

Yours sincerely,

Laurence Michelmore
Commissioner-General

His Excellency
Mr. C. E. King, C.M.G.
Ambassador of Great Britain
British Embassy
Beirut

*Copy under
Camps to
Mr. Moyle
& Sept with
ref. to his
letter of
8 April.*

*2
26/4*

M. Davies
M. Dath
Ry
A.D. W. in
No 24/4.
Jcm
23. iv



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1968
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14

C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF

H.M.A., Beirut
(C. E. King)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BEIRUT.

19 April, 1968



(18/2)

19 April, 1968

In replying to a Question in the House of Commons on 1 April, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Goronwy Roberts, undertook to draw to the attention of U.N.R.W.A. the views of his questioner concerning the provision of weatherproof camps in the Jordanian uplands. I enclose the relevant extract from Hansard.

The Minister of State is naturally well aware that this is a matter much in your thoughts at the present time. I venture to pass this on to you, not simply in execution of the Minister of State's undertaking to his questioner but also because I feel sure you would wish to take note of this expression of sympathy and concern in the British Parliament about the present conditions of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, on the occasion of the announcement in the House of Commons of an increased United Kingdom contribution to the Agency's funds.

(C. E. King)

M. L. Michelmore, Esq.,
Commissioner-General,
U.N.R.W.A.,
BEIRUT.

n.o.o.

Copy to :

J. C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

(with reference to your letter ER 2/18 of 8 April)

CONFIDENTIAL

(13)

(18/2)

1. Mr. Peter Jones
21.2
2. Mr. Andy Davis
for draft
reply.
AMM
21.2



British Embassy,
AMMAN.

19 February, 1968.

Dear Tony,

Refugees in Jordan

RT2/1

Our telegram No. 125 of 17 February gave you our first assessment of the effects of last week's Israeli bombardment of the Jordan Valley on the refugee situation.

2. Information we now have from UNRWA and the Jordan Government indicates that a great many refugees have, in fact, moved out of the Valley. The camp at Ghor Nimrin close to the Allenby Bridge is said now to be virtually empty and 80 to 90 per cent of the population of the old camp at Karameh, which is really a village inhabited mainly by 1948 refugees, have left. Refugees in tents have for the most part taken their tents with them and they are now squatting in and around Amman and in any other piece of vacant land they can find. As well as camp dwellers a large number of more or less settled farmers living in villages in the northern part of the Valley have left their homes; many of these are in fact UNRWA registered (1948) refugees.

3. The Jordan Government at a meeting with Michelmores last night have decided to urge the refugees who have moved up from the valley to go back again. They believe that in many cases families have been divided and these they will try to reunite. But they do not intend to use force to drive the people back and are prepared to open up to three new camps on the plateau to accommodate them. Sites for these have already been chosen near Sweilih about ten miles north of Amman and near Irbid in the north; a third possible site is said to be available somewhere in the Jerash/Ajlun area. All these sites are comparatively high and the risk of storm damage to them will be serious for the next month or so.

A.R. Moore Esq., C.M.G.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

/4.

I think original letters on the main file have dealt
p.a. with these points.
20.19.68

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4. Michelmores says that UNRWA have only 400 tents in reserve (many hundreds were destroyed by the Israeli shelling of their warehouse at Karamah) and the Jordan Government have about 1,600. This quantity will go nowhere towards equipping three new major camps and UNRWA is appealing for more. Specifically he asked me to pass on UNRWA's request to H.M.G. and I told him I would do so although I thought the possibility that we should have any tents available was a slim one. However, any contribution which we could make would be worth while, both on a humanitarian and political grounds. For the more uncomfortable the refugees are, the greater the likelihood that they will prove to be a restless and disruptive force here.

Yours ever,

Phillips

(P.G.D. Adams)

Copied to:-

H.B.M. Ambassador, Tel Aviv

H.B.M. Ambassador, Beirut,

Sir Leslie Glass, K.C.M.G., U.K. Mission to the U.N. New York

A.B. Urwick Esq., Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

Minister of State — has not
seen. Eastern Dept.
for advice and draft reply
from

Ried 16/4.

(12)

House of Commons,

London, S.W.1

PW
MS 16/4

10.4.48

E18/19

Dear Governor,

Many thanks for writing
me further re the Arab refugees and
for letting Mr. Nicholmore have my views.
I am sure his drive and tact will
achieve anything that can be achieved.
I appreciate the many problems involved
including an East-bank Arab view
that the refugees are the prime cause of
their own misfortunes. However, there
is a great gap between existing refugee
provision and a permanent camp which
could provide all sorts of permutations
in weather proofing and sanitation to
the great advantage of their inhabitants,

Yours sincerely,
Roland Foyle

(11)

DESPATCHED BY
MINISTER OF STATE'S OFFICE

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16 APR 1968
E 18 | 19

Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

9 April, 1968.

UNRWA

Following the undertaking I gave you in the House at Question Time on 1 April, our Ambassador in Beirut has been asked to draw the attention of UNRWA to your comment that suggestions be made to the Arab governments that adequate weatherproof camps be established on the uplands away from the flashpoint of the Jordan Valley.

I am sure that UNRWA will have this point very much in mind, but the Arab governments, and indeed even the refugees themselves, are often very sensitive about proposals which they consider might imply any degree of permanence in the establishment of camps and Mr. Michelmores has a delicate task in this case.

Part of Her Majesty's Government's contribution to UNRWA will no doubt be used for improving the condition of those unfortunate refugees who have fled the potential dangers of camps in the Jordan Valley for higher ground, and at the request of our Ambassador in Amman we have drawn the attention of British voluntary organisations to the renewed plight of these refugees.

(G. O. ROBERTS)

Roland Moyle, Esq., M.P.

Registry
No.

DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—

Roland Moyle, Esq., M.P.,
House of Commons.

From

Mr. Roberts

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

UNRWA

Following the undertaking I gave you in the House at Question Time on ~~Monday~~ ^{1 April}, our Ambassador in Beirut has been asked to draw the attention of UNRWA to your comment that suggestions be made to the Arab governments that adequate weatherproof camps be established on the uplands away from the flashpoint of the Jordan Valley.

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[Handwritten signature]
3/4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(10) JED

(~~FR2/18~~)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

8 April, 1968.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15
10 APR 1968
E/18/19

UNRWA

In replying to a question in the House by Mr. Moyle on 1 April, Mr. Roberts undertook to draw the attention of UNRWA to a suggestion of Mr. Moyle's concerning the provision of weatherproof camps in the uplands of the Jordan Valley. We realise that this is a matter which UNRWA have very much in mind, but as we are committed to informing them of Mr. Moyle's comments I should be grateful if you would do this in whatever way you consider most appropriate. I enclose the relevant extract from Hansard.

(J.C. Moberly)

His Excellency
Mr. C.E. King, C.M.G.,
Beirut.

Registry No.

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

To:—

C.E. King, Esq., C.M.G.,
Beirut.

From

J. Moore
~~A.R. Moore~~

Telephone No. & Ext.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

UNRWA

In replying to a question in the House by Mr. Moyle on 14 April, Mr. Roberts undertook to draw the attention of UNRWA to a suggestion of Mr. Moyle's concerning the provision of weatherproof camps in the uplands of the Jordan Valley. ~~I enclose herewith the relevant~~

~~extract from Hansard and would be most grateful if you would speak to the Commissioner-General accordingly. It is appreciated as Mr. Roberts pointed out to the questioner, that these suggestions may not be the first UNRWA has heard on the subject.~~


mention this

We realise that this is a matter which the UNRWA have very much in mind, but as we are committed to ^{informing} ~~UNRWA~~ ^{of} ~~Mr. Moyle's~~ ^{comment} ~~suggestion~~ to UNRWA. I should be grateful if you would do this in whatever way you consider most appropriate. I enclose the relevant extract from Hansard.

J. Moore
5.1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Reference.....



Eastern Department

You will have seen that in the House yesterday, Mr. Roberts undertook to draw the attention of UNRWA to Mr. Moyle's point about weatheproof camps away from the flashpoint of the Jordan Valley (Hansard of 1 April, Cols. 21 & 22). I should be grateful for advice for Mr. Roberts and for a draft letter to Mr. Moyle.

(H.J. Arbuthnott)

2 April, 1968

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RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVE
E18/19

Mr. Arbuthnott

UNRWA

I attach a self-explanatory letter from Mr. Roberts to Mr. Roland Moyle, M.P., informing him of action taken to carry out the undertaking Mr. Roberts gave him at Question Time in the House on 1 April to draw the attention of UNRWA to Mr. Moyle's comment about the provision of weather-proof camps on the uplands East of the River Jordan.

J. C. Moberly

(J.C. Moberly)

8 April, 1968.

①



Mr. Dally NT 114
Mr. Alison
Ry 15/4/68
Jan. 28. iii

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27/2

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
12 March 1968.

ARCHIVES IN. 10

4 APR 1968

Dear John,

Refugees

E18 | 19

I enclose an extract from the Senate Congressional Record of 11 March, reprinting at the request of Senator Scott (an influential, moderate Republican from Pennsylvania) an article by James Sheldon which first appeared in the Spring issue of the magazine published by the Society for the Prevention of World War III entitled "Wanted: A New Policy for UNRWA and Middle East Refugees". Sheldon is known to the State Department as a writer on Middle East subjects of Zionist sympathies.

2. The article, which is strongly pro-Israeli in tone, suggests among other things that the Americans should consider putting payments to UNRWA on a month-to-month basis, making part of the U.S. contribution contingent upon the taking of reasonable steps towards permanent solutions. The article also calls for the establishment of a new agency by the United Nations aimed not merely at relief but also at the resettlement of the refugees in the context of a general economic plan for the Middle East.

3. The official responsible for refugee matters in the Bureau of Near East Affairs tells me that the State Department foresees plenty of trouble ahead when the U.S. contribution to UNRWA comes up for consideration next Spring in Congress. They are at the moment working on a paper about the strategy to be followed in the UNRWA debate at the United Nations next Autumn.

Yours ever,
Alan

(A.B. Urwick).

J.C. Moberly, Esq.
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

Cc: Amman
Beirut
Cairo
Tel Aviv
UKMis. New York

Py
15/4/68

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MIDDLE EAST REFUGEES

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the latest issue of *Prevent World War III*, No. 71, winter-spring 1968, published by the Society for the Prevention of World War III, Inc., 50 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019, contains an extended article entitled "Wanted: A New Policy for UNRWA and Middle East Refugees," which deals with the problem of UNRWA and the Middle East refugees—both the history of this problem and possible ways of solving it.

The article was written by Dr. James H. Sheldon, a foreign correspondent who has spent a great deal of time in the Middle East and whose writings on that part of the world have appeared in many places. It is necessary for the United States to develop new approaches toward the entire question of Middle East refugees, and I believe that the information contained in this publication may be of substantial help in achieving that purpose.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WANTED: A NEW POLICY FOR UNRWA AND MIDDLE EAST REFUGEES (By James H. Sheldon)¹

For 19 years the existence of a huge number of displaced persons in the Middle East has been one of the most unsettling factors in that part of the globe. It is high time for the world to take a new look at the whole problem: how it began, how the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) has tried to deal with it, and how we can act to bring about some permanent solution.

HOW THE PROBLEM BEGAN

During the late forties, about a half-million Arabs left that part of Palestine which has now become Israel. Some were motivated by fear, others by the blandishment of Arab military leaders and the Grand Mufti's Arab Higher Committee, which urged all Arabs to leave their homes in that part of the world, so as "not to be in the way" of the Arab armies bent on invading Israel, and often with the implied promise that they would soon be able to return and "inherit" the properties of their erstwhile Jewish neighbors.

The exact number of persons involved is still a major subject of dispute, and is probably a good deal less than the half-million figure which we have used, because "needy" persons were often accepted as "refugees," and there was no exact census—but this figure is large enough to include

¹Dr. James H. Sheldon, the author of this article, is a foreign correspondent and a columnist for the *American Examiner*. He is Chairman of the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League, and was formerly a professor at Boston University.

any responsible estimates that have been made.

Almost simultaneously, another half-million inhabitants of Arab countries (notably, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Morocco) were compelled to leave their homes, often under conditions of great deprivation or peril, and become refugees in Israel. Here, the figure is more exact, because Israeli records are more precise.

The Jews who fled to Israel were promptly absorbed and resettled in productive work. None of them ever received compensation for their lost possessions.

The displaced Arabs, however, were treated quite differently. They were not welcomed as newcomers into the lands of their Arab brothers. Unlike other post-war situations involving large population exchanges, most of the host countries did not accept them for resettlement; instead, they were herded together in "refugee camps" in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.

As a result, in 1949 the United Nations General Assembly established UNRWA, for the stated purpose of dealing with these Arab refugees—whose number has grown to 1,344,576 "registered" persons, according to the June 30, 1967, report of UNRWA.

THE NUMBER INCREASES

No solution is in sight: in fact, the problem continually enlarges, as families proliferate and more unattached persons insinuate themselves into the sheltering arms of UNRWA.

Still another dimension has been added by a new wave of displaced persons resulting from the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967.

Meanwhile, UNRWA has spent about \$600 million—70% of it from contributions made by the United States. Contributions from 82 other countries have made up the remainder of the budget. The Soviet Union, although increasingly involved in the affairs of the Arab world, has not contributed.

Any attempt to consider next steps immediately becomes bogged down for lack of accurate information. Although UNRWA is able to announce a total number of "registered" persons, no one really knows what this figure means.

As one UNRWA Commissioner observed, the reported death rate in the refugee camps is one of the lowest in the world—and the birth rate is among the highest. In fact, a large portion of the deaths go unreported and the ration cards are passed from hand to hand, or used as currency by local merchants. A reverse procedure sometimes occurs with births. As UNRWA's director observed in his annual report for 1951-52, "to increase . . . their rations they (the refugees) eagerly report births, sometimes passing a newborn baby from family to family."

Senator Albert Gore, returning from a visit to several refugee centers early in 1967, humorously told of arriving at a camp when a funeral was in progress. As soon as the participants heard that a United States Senator was present, he said, the funeral disappeared, and "even the corpse disappeared."

In short, if we are to go forward with a continued and perhaps enlarged program for UNRWA, the very first step must be a complete and accurate census of the population concerned.

Such a census has long been opposed by most of the "host" governments, for political reasons with which the director has not been able to interfere.

The Commissioner General's report for June 30, 1966, for example, notes on page 8 that "In Jordan, no systematic reverification has been possible since 1953, when disorders in the refugee camps caused the Government to call a halt to UNRWA's efforts to carry out a general scrutiny of ration entitlements."

If a census is the first requisite for planning the future of UNRWA, the second problem is even more important, viz: What has happened to the resettlement program?

WHAT ABOUT RESETTLEMENT?

When UNRWA was established, it was with the understanding that one of its functions would be to help resettle refugees in the vast open spaces of the Arab lands, such as the arable areas of Syria and Iraq (two of the world's underpopulated countries).

Every effort at resettlement has been met with a block. Various items earmarked for this purpose, totalling more than \$200 million, have gone unexpended, reverting to the general funds of the relief agency. Failure to use this money for the intended purposes constitutes an almost unique record in any public budget.

When from time to time efforts were made to put more emphasis on resettlement, Egypt's official weekly magazine, *The Arab Observer*, attacked such plans as a "plot" to liquidate the refugee problem—thereby depriving President Nasser of one of the principal emotional arguments used in his campaign against Israel.

In actual fact, a considerable portion of the refugees in Jordan are at least partly employed—but local wage levels are so low that in many cases a refugee is not considered "employed" in this context until he is earning an outside salary which is more than that earned by many of the lower-level employees of the Jordan government itself. A kind of international boondoggle has thus been established.

The lot of the refugees in the Gaza Strip has been very different. Until quite recently, there were no comparable opportunities for employment there, and the administering country, Egypt, kept these people bottled up as if they were exhibits in a zoo, even denying them permission to travel to other territories where host governments were willing to receive them.

Still more disturbing is the evidence of *illicit political purposes for which the refugees have been used.*

When Ahmad Shukairy organized his guerrillas to invade Israeli territory under the banner of the Palestine Liberation Organization, he set out to train 12-14 thousand young men (mostly in the Gaza Strip), whose rations were being supplied by UNRWA. This amounted to using the money of the United States and other supporting nations for the purposes of training guerrillas to invade a friendly country. As a result, Senator Edward Kennedy and others interposed strong objections to the annual appropriation for UNRWA, unless this situation could be corrected.

In the 1966 report of the Commissioner General, we find this passage: "*Doubts have been expressed by some governments about the propriety of the Agency's issuing rations which may be consumed by young men in military training under the auspices of the Palestine Liberation Organization. . . . In light of these differences, arrangements have been made for special added donations to the amount of \$150 thousand which meets the total cost of any rations consumed by the young men in question.*"

In plain English, the Arab States were to be permitted to use UNRWA facilities for training guerrillas, provided only that they paid for it. A careful scrutiny of the Commissioner General's 1967 report, however, fails to disclose any mention of this arrangement, and the auditor's tables included in the report did not disclose that any "special contributions" were ever received for the purpose.

On the contrary, at the end of the fighting in June 1967, at least 4 thousand of Shukairy's guerrilla forces retreated to Egypt, where it appears they are still receiving UNRWA assistance.

UNRWA AND THE GUERRILLAS

Whatever the device invented to "separate" the funds used to support these guerrillas, the fact remains: A relief agency simply cannot afford to be caught administering funds

(even earmarked funds) for training guerrillas whose purpose it is to upset the peace and create still more refugees.

This is a situation that has to be dealt with firmly and decisively before the future of UNRWA is determined.²

The problems inherent in the present UNRWA set-up are further complicated by the fact that virtually all of the staff are nationals of the host countries, a circumstance that makes for easy use of the camps as places for political indoctrination.

At the start of 1967, 11,404 Arab functionaries were responsible for the day-to-day affairs of UNRWA operation, with only about 112 professionals on the international staff. Correspondents uniformly report that the Arab staff, on the lower levels, use their positions for the purpose of constant propagandizing and indoctrination.

The host governments consider that Arab employees of UNRWA are subject to local regulation, and all owe varying degrees of allegiance to the local authorities. This of course tends to increase the amount of political propagandizing that goes on in the camps. It also results in the establishment of a substantial bureaucracy having a vested interest in the perpetuation of misery, and the postponement of effective resettlement steps.

With few exceptions, textbooks and other educational materials used in training the refugee children have been under control of the host countries, and are replete with anti-Israel and anti-Western propaganda, in spite of the fact that the costs are paid for by UNRWA itself. This is a point in respect to which several Commissioners have complained, but without result.

When the Israeli army occupied the West Bank, it found such examples as the following, quoted from a 4th grade textbook on Arab and Islamic history:

"Jews love only Jews and they are treacherous liars."

The same type of theme was often repeated in examples used for elementary reading and spelling texts, and in making up problems for arithmetic. One book even devoted several pages to extracts from the notorious anti-Jewish forgery known as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

REFUGEE CAMPS VERSUS ARAB VILLAGES

Finally, the present program fails to take into consideration many basic factors having to do with the social and economic structure of the Arab countries themselves.

Although apologists constantly speak of the "poor refugees," in many places the refugees are, in actual fact, better off than inhabitants in the surrounding Arab villages. In trying to estimate the relative status of refugees and the indigenous population, it is necessary not only to see the camps, but also the local villages. I did this during an extensive visit not long ago, and found that in most of the camps in Jordan sanitary conditions, health, educational facilities and even housing were superior to the same factors in near-by villages. Such very obvious things as the number of radio sets in sight confirmed the same impression. Housing in the camps was miserable, if compared even with the slums in New York—but it was nevertheless superior to that in near-by villages.

This is not to say that the refugees in Jordan are well off: they are not. But by comparison with their neighbors, they are not badly off. This situation leads to obvious

² The problem was not changed by the enforced resignation, in December, of Mr. Shukairy, whose one-man diplomacy had made him unpopular with some Arab leaders. His successor, Yehia Hammouda, is a lawyer with long communist connections and a reputation for organization abilities, under whom the Egyptians seem to feel that they may be more successful in uniting hitherto dissident guerrilla groups.

social and political tensions, and makes it more difficult to adjust the rolls so as to limit them to legitimate cases.

Even the use of the word "camp" is a misnomer (except for the new crop of people dislocated in June of 1967). Only three or four tents were to be found anywhere in the refugee areas, at the time of my visit, and all except one of these belonged to wandering desert traders who had dropped in to do some business.

I do not make these comments for the purpose of begrudging anything to those who are legitimate refugees, or to anyone else who is in need—but the time has come when the matter of economic development in the Middle East must be thought of as a whole, rather than just as a question of "relief" for one special group. A future UNRWA must be conceived and planned as part of an over-all economic policy for the entire area. It does little permanent good to provide relief for a limited group, when the entire countryside is in need of reconstruction—and to continue to keep this special group separated from the rest of the population, and sustained by international charity, merely perpetuates the problem.

Some effective starts have been made in Jordan, by setting up rural cooperatives and similar enterprises centered about the refugee settlements. These projects have not been as extensive as they ought to be, nor have they met with the positive response that should have come, because they tend always to belie the "separateness" of the refugee population, and thus become involved in the entire nexus of political questions surrounding the subject.

The host countries, in fact, have profited greatly by the presence of UNRWA, which has brought a major item of foreign exchange into their area.

In addition, some host countries have managed to use UNRWA as a source for a fairly substantial amount of direct revenue. About a million-and-a-half dollars have been paid in taxes on UNRWA installations in Jordan, Syria and other states, in spite of the fact that property of the international agency was supposed to be tax-exempt so far as local governments are concerned. Customs duties have even been collected on some portions of the material imported for the construction of refugee camps, and several disputes with regard to overcharges on railways have gone on ever since 1954. A reorganization of UNRWA must certainly eliminate these abuses. It is highly unlikely that the American taxpayer will be disposed to continue a relief operation from which Arab governments collect revenue.

It is worth noting at this point that Israel has issue orders that no taxes or customs duties shall be collected at any time, with respect to those UNRWA operations which are now located within territory that she administers.

PART OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT

By this time, it must be clear that a settlement of the refugee question must now be considered as part of an over-all political settlement in the Middle East. This is obvious from the history of the subject, and it is now an implicit part of American Middle East policy, as defined in President Johnson's five basic points set forth last June.

There are at least 40 million persons in the world who have become displaced, in one way or another, since the beginning of World War II. It is a depressing commentary on recent Middle Eastern history to reflect that, out of all this vast number, only the million-and-a-third (if we count the original refugees and all their descendants and other additions to the total) in the Middle East have remained untouched by plans for permanent resettlement.

The explanation is to be found, of course, in the attitude of the intransigent rulers of the Arab states themselves, who have stead-

fastly opposed all resettlement programs and insisted upon regarding the refugee issue as a major *casus belli*. For them, the only "solution" is to "return the refugees to Palestine" and end the existence of what they insist upon calling the "illegal" state of Israel. Indeed, even to this moment the official maps provided by the Arab Information Office in New York continue to show Israel as "Arab territory" temporarily "occupied" by Israel.

During a period in which there have been scores of changes of government in the Arab world, accompanied by complex and changing alliances, this is one of the few matters on which succeeding governments have been consistent—for the obvious reason that it provided a ready-made basis for emotional appeals under varying conditions of local crisis. Meanwhile, the refugees and the world at large have been the sufferers.

At the very beginning, in a declaration by the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammed el-Din, on Oct. 11, 1949, we were told:

"In demanding the restoration of the refugees to Palestine, the Arabs intend that they shall return as the masters of the homeland . . . More explicitly, they intend to annihilate the state of Israel."

A decade later, as an official Cairo Propaganda Ministry broadcast put it, Sept. 1, 1960:

"It is obvious that the return of one million Arabs to Palestine will make them the majority of Israel's inhabitants. Then they will be able to impose their will on the Jews and expel them from Palestine."

The same chimerical approach continued even in the 1967 General Assembly of the United Nations, and in December the spokesman of the Palestine Arab Delegation told the UN Political Committee that he would oppose any UNRWA policy which threatened "a liquidation of the Palestine problem."

ESSENTIAL REFORMS IN UNRWA

This sort of thing cannot, of course, go on forever. It is time to consider a permanent solution for the refugee question, along lines of economically viable resettlement—as part of a general political agreement.

Meanwhile, certain obvious reforms must be undertaken within UNRWA itself. As a minimum, these would include:

A careful census of the refugees.

Establishment of a workable record system, including revision of the rolls to eliminate interlopers and dead people.

Elimination of war-breeding activities connected with the camps.

Control of educational affairs by the international agency.

Development and application of plans for permanent resettlement.

The new refugee problem arising in connection with the war of June, 1967, has resulted in moving some of the "old" refugees (voluntarily or otherwise) to different locations, and in addition has created a smaller group of "new" cases. These are being dealt with at present on an emergency basis, and they must continue to receive the attention that the world's conscience requires they be given. Before the "new" group is inextricably mixed with the "old," however, it is urgent that we decide upon a policy for dealing with the whole question.

STEPS FOR THE FUTURE

The solution to the refugee problem, of course, lies in resettlement. This was most clearly pointed out by the late Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, who in 1959 surveyed the situation and concluded that the refugees could ultimately be absorbed in the developing economy of the Near East—not as a liability, but as an important asset. The Arab delegates attacked the Hammarskjöld report, because of its emphasis on resettlement—and the issue was again postponed.

The United States, as a principal con-

tributor to UNRWA, has from time to time reached similar conclusions, but has been unable to enforce them. In 1955 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported that "a permanent solution of the Arab refugee problem can only be found through rehabilitation and resettlement and the Committee has repeatedly expressed its deep concern over the lack of progress in this direction." Six years later the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs reached a similar conclusion, following a study of the question—and there are dozens of similar reports that might be quoted. The tragedy is that although we *knew* what should be done, no effective steps were taken to put our knowledge into practice.

One result of the June, 1967, fighting has been that at long last many diplomats are convinced that the basic problems of the Middle East, including the refugee question, must now be reexamined. As a result, some faint glimmerings of progress are in sight.

It is time for the United Nations to establish a new agency not merely for relief, but for resettlement of the refugees—and this in the context of a general economic plan for the Middle East.

In the December, 1967, meeting of the UN General Assembly's Political Committee, Foreign Minister Frank Aiken of Ireland suggested establishment of a United Nations Compensation and Resettlement Fund, "to give generous resettlement grants to the Arab families who are not restored to their homes and property in Israel," in order to settle the refugee problem definitively. This is the kind of step which must be taken sooner or later.

ISRAEL'S CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL

At the same time, Israel's Ambassador Michael Comay proposed that negotiations should immediately be initiated between Israel and the Arab host countries, together with the main contributing nations to UNRWA, to arrange a five-year plan for the rehabilitation of the refugees and their permanent integration into the economic life of the region. Mr. Comay announced that Israeli experts have been working on detailed and practical proposals looking in this direction. He pointed out that Israel had neither the duty nor the capacity to solve the problem alone, but was prepared to participate fully in international and regional plans to deal with the issue within the framework of plans for permanent peace. He appealed to the Arab states "on humanitarian grounds" not to reject the Israeli proposal out of hand, and renewed past offers of Israel to participate in an international reintegration and compensation fund to finance the solution of the refugee question. "The time," he concluded, "has come to move along the path to reconciliation."

It is also time for translating official talks into definite plans. As a first step, we propose the appointment by the Secretary General of a high-level international committee of experts, to survey the entire question of Middle East refugees, including the part played by UNRWA, with a view to getting the facts on which action can be based.

As a parallel action for the United States, it is time that we, as the chief contributor, make clear that future support for UNRWA depends upon prompt and vigorous internal reforms in the direction outlined earlier in this article. We should, at the same time, use our strongest efforts to support a new international resettlement program, along lines such as those suggested by Foreign Minister Aiken, Ambassador Comay, and the numerous report of our own Congressional committees. To make certain that action follows, we should also consider putting our payments to UNRWA upon a month-to-month basis, making part of our contribution contingent upon the taking of reasonable steps toward permanent solutions.

E18/19

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CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL,
JERUSALEM.

28 February, 1968.

(1082/68)

ET 4/10

Dear John,

Relief and Reconstruction in the West Bank.

In my letter 1082/67 of 7 December I reported that the Israelis had announced their intention of re-housing the inhabitants of Kalkilya. Ted Key went there last week to see how this was getting on, and I enclose his account of his visit. We have not been to Beit Awwa and Beit Mersin recently but UNRWA tell me that reconstruction on a similar basis is making good progress there. They are, of course, much smaller villages than Kalkilya and the houses there were more modest. If this were genuine war damage the inhabitants would, of course, be lucky to get even this amount of compensation. Most of the destruction was, however, as we know, done intentionally well after the fighting ceased in pursuit of a policy that has never become clear but was later reversed. All one can say of the compensation, therefore, is that it is better than nothing.

2. There is no change in the situation at Imwas, Beit Nuba and Yalu in the Latrun salient. I visited them recently and found that they had been completely obliterated. Earth has been bulldozed over the sites so that no trace of the villages remains, and the inhabitants are, of course, not allowed back. I enclose a copy of another petition signed by leading residents of the three villages. The UNRWA representative has taken their case up again with the Israeli Minister of Defence and there does not appear to be anything that Britain as such can do to help them. They have been offered relief, which they have so far refused, but no form of compensation. What they want, of course, is to go back to their land but there seems to be little prospect of the Israelis conceding this.

3. As foreshadowed in paragraph 4 of my letter of 7 December the Israelis have forbidden UNRWA to give relief or rations to anyone who was not their responsibility before June. The newly displaced persons are the responsibility of the Israeli Ministry of Welfare, which claims to be granting them relief in kind. This claim is, however, a little misleading since the Israelis appear only to designate the recipients, and the relief is actually supplied and distributed by voluntary agencies, notably CARE and the Lutheran World Federation. The funds for the rebuilding of houses, however, are provided by the Israeli Government.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Tel Aviv, Amman and the United Kingdom Mission, New York.

Yours ever,
John Lewen
(J. H. Lewen)

J. C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

CONFIDENTIAL

H.M.C.G.

Reconstruction in Qalkilya

A start was made a few weeks ago with the repair and partial reconstruction of some of the 1200 houses in Qalkilya demolished or damaged by fire dynamite or bulldozer by the Israelis during the three weeks after the June war.

2. An Israeli government commission visited the town and fixed a scale of compensation according to the amount of damage suffered with a ceiling of 250 J.D. for a house which was completely destroyed. The owner of a house with one room destroyed would receive about £80. The compensation is, of course, totally inadequate and the best a man whose house has been totally destroyed can do is to build a one-room shelter.

3. I walked round the centre of the town which suffered most damage and it presented an appalling picture. Nevertheless, the are getting down to the task with a will and I was impressed by their morale and cheerfulness. Qalkilya must have been a prosperous town before the 1949 war - the inhabitants owned several thousands of acres of citrous orchards, in what is now Israel and when they lost these they planted an almost equal number in areas hitherto uncultivated. All the houses are, by Arab standards, well built and made of stone so that a compensation of J.D.250 is derisory. Indeed, a number of the wealthy householders rejected it.

4. After walking round the town I called on the Mayor and later had lunch with him. He is a most impressive and dignified person, and never once uttered a word of self-pity. He confirmed my impression of the high morale of the people of the town and said they were determined to restore this town to its former state even though it might take a long time. He said that in addition to the compensation to individuals the Israeli Government had made a 3 year loan of IL.80,000 at 6% to help restore public facilities. Electricity and water had already been reconnected. He made warm references to Great Britain and said it was thanks to a generous loan from H.M.G. that the town was able to plant new lands after the losses of 1948. Perhaps, he said with a smile, H.M.G. would again remember Qalkilya.

(E. E. KEY),
22 February, 1968.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Their Honours,
The American Consul, American Consulate-General, Jerusalem.
The British Consul, British Consulate-General, Jerusalem.
The French Consul, French Consulate-General, Jerusalem.
The Royal Belgium Consul, The Royal Consulate-General, Jerusalem.
The Sweden Consul, The Sweden Consulate-General, Jerusalem.

Dear Sirs,

We the undersigned, representatives of 'Imwas, Yalou and Beit-Nuba villages, now living in the West Bank, have the honour to approach your goodselves with this petition, hoping that the contents of which will receive your kind attention and consideration.

It is actually known by you what happened to our villages and to ourselves during the June War, whereas we were forced to leave and abandon our villages leaving behind all our movable and immovable property, and most of us evacuated bare of clothes.

Moreover our houses were demolished and no trace to it.

Due to these facts, the UNRWA considered us as refugees and continued to distribute on us some of living goods, and after seven months of this, noticed us of the stoppage of the help, and informed us that the Israeli authorities, or the Welfare Department will take care of us, which this, we consider it injustice to our rights, while most of us refused this offer.

And whereas we became penniless and in poverty, and in great need of help and assistance, we therefore implore your goodselves in the name of humanity, justice and mercy to help us with all means and to repeat to take the necessary steps to assist us, and asking that your great Government will explain the matter with the Israeli authorities to turn us back to our villages to re-habit and re-build them after asking our compensation against our demolished houses and the lost movable property.

In this state we do not need the help of the UNRWA nor the welfare, in the contrary we ask that the UNRWA should take care of us until the discussion of our state and matter.

With thanks.

'Imwas village

Heider Mustafa
El-Haj Mohd. Keilani
Mahmoud Abdel Hamid

Yalou village

Suleiman Ali Suleiman
Ibrahim Nassar
Mahmoud Jibreen
Daoud Nawwas


Beit Nuba village

Jaber Odeh
Jaser Abdel Raheem
Ali Mustafa
Odeh Suleiman Deeb

[received 22 February, 1968.]

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Aislinn
Mr. Dany
11. xii



BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL,
JERUSALEM.

104

7 December, 1967.

(1082/67)

Dear Madam,

NT.

Destroyed Villages.

In correspondence resting with Norman Aspin's letter 1083/67 of 14 August and my letter 1082/67 of 24 August we reported the intentional destruction of several West Bank villages by the Israeli forces in the days immediately following the fighting.

2. The Israeli authorities have now announced that they intend to rehouse the inhabitants of Kalkilya by repairing damaged houses and replacing those completely destroyed with one-room dwellings which the families will be assisted by loans to expand. (This is similar to the system by which the UNRWA refugee camps were built.) The UNRWA representative, however, who has just been there, tells me that this is still only a declaration of intention and that no work has yet started. The inhabitants are still living in the ruins or in tents that have been provided by UNRWA and voluntary organisations. The decision to rebuild the village is, of course, a step forward, though it would have been much more helpful if it had been taken in time for work to start before the winter rains came on, as they have now done in earnest.

3. The Israelis had already declared their intention not to allow inhabitants to return to the three villages destroyed in the Iatron area (Beit Nuba, Imwas and Yalu) and they are sticking firmly to this. The area is still closed to normal traffic. The Mayors of Ramallah and Birah have recently circulated an appeal for help for the population pleading in particular that they should be allowed to return to the destroyed villages. The appeal contains an account of the destruction in the following terms:-

"On the 14th of June 1967, nearly a week after the occupation of the West Bank by the Israeli Defence Army, and the Cease Fire Agreement, the unarmed and peaceful inhabitants of the three above mentioned Arab front-line villages were unscrupulously and willfully forced to abandon their homes and seek open-air shelter and refuge elsewhere, yet, completely outside their own vicinity and immediate neighbourhood. Once deserted, no time was wasted and the Israeli Demolishing Squads completely annihilated what those villagers had built and cherished through long and trying years."

/This

J. C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

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This rings true and is closely in line with what we know to have been done in the other villages. The appeal says that 9,000 people are involved but other estimates which we have reported have never put the number higher than 6,000. The UNRWA representative thinks that there are now only about 2,000 of them living in neighbouring villages and that the others have crossed the Jordan.

4. These newly-displaced persons are not formally the responsibility of UNRWA, who had nevertheless to step into the breach and are still providing emergency feeding and medical services for them. The Israeli authorities have rather resented UNRWA's intervention but could hardly complain since they did very little themselves. They have now told UNRWA that the Israeli Ministry of Welfare will take over full responsibility for persons displaced by the June war as from 1 January, 1968, at which time UNRWA's responsibility for them will cease. The UNRWA representative is, however, waiting for written confirmation of this before planning to cut off help to these people. The numbers are not great in relation to UNRWA's responsibility for old refugees on the West Bank. This has been reduced by the movement across the Jordan but still stands at a ration strength of 160,000 plus about 60,000 registered refugees not entitled to rations.

5. A few people are still being displaced by destruction, such as that at Jiflik referred to in my letter of 22 November (not to UNRWA, New York). This was not an UNRWA village but the local statement that the occupants were offered alternative accommodation is, according to the UNRWA representative, not quite accurate. What has happened is that the few remaining villagers are squatting in scattered empty houses in the neighbourhood, but these also are due to be razed for security reasons and they will then be homeless.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries in Tel Aviv and Amman and to Stephen Egerton at the United Kingdom Mission, New York.

yours sincerely,
J. K. Lewen
for
(J. K. Lewen)

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M.F. Daly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.



M. F. Daly
Secretary
Emb
M 6/3

D.G. Crawford

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

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ARCHIVES 15.15
15 MAR 1968
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4 March, 1968

AMMAN.

Jordan Refugees

Mr. Blackiston of the U.S. Embassy told me on 28 February that the latest information they had was that there were now 30,000 refugees in the UNRWA camp at Ain al-Pasha (which, because Pasha was "a dirty word", is being renamed Bakha). A camp at Suf, on the site of the one which was washed away last winter, had been set up and there were several thousand refugees already there. A new camp in the Jerash area was being set up to take the Gaza refugees and the camp site at Marka was being re-activated as an "emergency" camp.

2. Tentage: The German charitable institute, Caritas, had flown in 500 tents (Mr. Blackiston thought six-man tents) and the West German Embassy was bringing in by sea a further 1,250 nine-man tents. Already in reserve are 2,500 tents. The number of tents held would, therefore, accommodate about 30,000 refugees. The Jordan government say they are ordering 2,000 tents (probably from Pakistan) and UNRWA have placed an order for a further 1,000. 2,900 blankets were already available from Caritas and more were being brought in. Nearly all the tents in the valley camps have disappeared; it would be reasonable to assume that not less than half the tents originally in the valley, i.e. 6,000, have now been moved to the high lands and are at present accommodating 30,000 refugees.

3. For the time being, therefore, it seems that the tentage position is reasonably satisfactory, but Mr. Fisher, the Director of UNRWA in Jordan, has explained that about 1,000 tents a month are required as replacements.

4. Clinics: The Ministerial Committee for Refugees has decided that health care in the new camp at Bakha should be shared between Save the Children Fund (0-3 years), the Iraqi medical team (3-15 years) and UNRWA (over 15 years). I have spoken to Col. Skelton who tells me that S.C.F. would prefer to look after children between the ages of 0 and 5 and he is attempting to arrange this. He told me that there were too many medical teams in the camp at Bakha "all falling over each other". S.C.F. proposed in any case to send their health visitor to Suf and Jerash to continue to care for those refugees who had been their S.C.F. responsibility in the valley camps. He believed that the Lutherans would be setting up a clinic in Suf.

5. As regards American proposals, Mr. Blackiston told me that they would examine the situation when it had stabilised to see what aid would be most appropriate. They were resisting the temptation to send off requests for more tents etc. since they did not wish to duplicate what was already being done. They had, however, sent an enquiry to their Mission in Delhi to see whether the Indian government would agree to the U.S. government financing the purchase of tents made in India out of local currency.

6. I told Mr. Blackiston that as far as H.M.G. were concerned we had earlier enquired about the possibility of providing tentage but that this would only be possible on a repayment basis and our advice to UNRWA had been to investigate Pakistan and Indian resources, rather than buy expensive tents in the U.K. which would have to be freighted to Jordan (at a very high cost).

J. P. Tripp

(J. P. Tripp)
29 February, 1968

~~A2~~ *POT a/m*

Noyl (copies as appropriate under comp. dup.)

- to Mr. Daly Eaten Dept, Chem. series,

Tel. Mr. Beint, UNM's New York & Washington

Commbat - General Jerusalem

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YPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO. 917

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
15 MARCH 1968

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 917 OF 15 MARCH
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK
AND SAVING TO BEIRUT.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 810: PALESTINE REFUGEES.

WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE U.S. EMBASSY
IN AMMAN HAVE RECOMMENDED THE SUPPLY OF TWO THOUSAND TENTS
AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THESE BE PURCHASED IN INDIA. THE STATE
DEPARTMENT HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SUPPLY THE TENTS, BUT ARE STILL
NOT THINKING IN TERMS OF ANY ADDITIONAL CASH GRANT FROM U.S.
SOURCES.

F O PASS AMMAN 72 AND TEL AVIV 67 AND SAVING TO BEIRUT 31.

SIR P. DEAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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
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Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

no 279

30 March 1968



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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 279 of 30 March. Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, JIG Cyprus, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Beirut.

Refugees.

The problem of the refugees on the East Bank, whose numbers have increased rapidly because of recent events, has tended to be overshadowed by the fighting and the growing influence of the Fedayeen; nevertheless, among its many other preoccupations, the refugee burden is a matter of increasing concern for the Jordan Government.

2. Figures issued by UNWRA on 21 March showed that the total camp population on the high ground north and south of Amman was 161,600. This total admittedly includes the 1948 refugees in the permanent UNWRA camps but even their populations have been substantially increased since 21 March by villagers and Bedouin from the valley who have fled for safety. This latest exodus has placed a severe strain on the existing facilities in all camps. Moreover immediately preceding and now following the fighting on 29 March in the valley, thousands more people have flooded into the northern town of Irbid and the camps surrounding it.

3. Major Cooper, Secretary of the British Relief Fund here, visited camps between Amman and Irbid yesterday. He reports considerable overcrowding and a shortage of tents. Many families were living in the open air (it had rained on 28 March) and others were contriving to provide themselves with temporary shelter out of sacking. Ration distribution among refugees has also been disrupted by the general exodus from the valley; by the establishment of a number of unofficial small camps (in addition to the ten official camps) on the Highlands and by the arrival of new refugees without UNWRA ration cards (especially men from Ghaza who have left their families behind).

4. I understand that ^{CVI} have decided that they cannot increase their support for UNWRA at this time. But the need for tents is urgent and (due to normal wastage) will continue to be high. I should be grateful if this could be brought once more to the notice of the British voluntary agencies.

Foreign Office pass Priority New York 76, Jerusalem 92 routine to Washington 86, JIG Cyprus 28, Beirut 160.

Mr. Adams

[Repetition to Beirut referred for Departmental decision. Repeated as requested to other posts.]
[Sent to D.C.C.]

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 544

4 MARCH 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

IMPEL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 544 OF 4 MARCH REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ROME AMMAN CAIRO WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA.

FOR ACTION FIRST THING TUESDAY.

MIDDLE EAST - FOOD FOR DISPLACED PERSONS.

SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS RECEIVED A LETTER FROM BOERMA OF F A O AND THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME FORWARDING A LETTER FROM MICHELMORE DESCRIBING THE CRITICAL SITUATION WHICH WILL ARISE AT THE END OF MARCH WHEN THE CURRENT EMERGENCY FOOD AID PROGRAMME ENDS. W F P HAS PROVIDED 3.5 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF EMERGENCY FOOD AID FOR SIX MONTHS FOR 150,000 REFUGEES IN JORDAN, 100,000 IN SYRIA AND 35,000 IN U A R. FURTHER AID CANNOT BE SUPPLIED BY W F P, AND THE SITUATION OF UNRWA WOULD NOT PERMIT THEM TO ASSUME THIS BURDEN: SEE MYTEL NO 538. - ? E

2...BOERMA PROPOSES TO SECRETARY-GENERAL AN INTERNATIONAL APPEAL FOR SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS PROVIDED THE THREE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ARE IN FAVOUR. THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN CONSULTED. MEANWHILE THE SECRETARIAT HAVE TODAY SOUNDED THE AMERICANS, CANADIANS AND OURSELVES TO ASCERTAIN OUR REACTIONS TO BOERMA'S PROPOSAL. THEY HAVE ASKED FOR A QUICK RESPONSE BUT WE AND THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD THEM THAT THIS WILL TAKE TIME TO CONSIDER.

3...BOERMA RECOMMENDS THAT CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND SHOULD BE INVITED OF FLOUR, COOKING OIL, RICE, SUGAR, PULSES, MILK POWDER AND CANNED BEEF OR MUTTON, AND THE DONORS SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE COST OF SHIPPING TO MIDDLE EAST. W F P WOULD HELP IN PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

4...THE CANADIANS AND AMERICANS ARE REFERRING FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND CANNOT YET GIVE US ANY INDICATION OF WHAT THESE ARE LIKELY TO BE. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

F O PASS ROME 8, AMMAN 36, CAIRO 44.

LORD CARADON.

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original on ER/18
brought back to UNRWA

EN CLAIR
PRIORITY UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 538 4 MARCH 1968

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 538 OF 4 MARCH REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, AND SAVING TO
CAIRO, BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS ISSUED A NOTE (S/8435 AND A/7060
OF 2 MARCH 1968, COPIES BY BAG) DRAWING ATTENTION TO A REPORT BY
MR. LAURENCE MICHELMORE, COMMISSION GENERAL OF UNRWA, ON RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN JORDAN.

2. MR. MICHELMORE'S REPORT SHOWS THAT RECENT INCIDENTS IN THE
JORDAN VALLEY HAVE CAUSED ABOUT 75,000 REFUGEES AND DISPLACED
PERSONS THERE TO ABANDON THEIR HOMES AND TEMPORARY SHELTERS AND
SEEK REFUGE ON THE HIGHER GROUND TO THE EAST. THESE DEVELOPMENTS,
HE POINTS OUT, CONFRONT THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND UNRWA WITH A
NEW EMERGENCY WHICH WILL REQUIRE THOUSANDS OF ADDITIONAL TENTS
AND MORE FUNDS TO DEAL WITH IT. AS UNRWA ALREADY FACES A DEFICIT
OF FOUR MILLION DOLLARS FOR ITS EXISTING SERVICES, SPECIAL
CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NEEDED TO OVERCOME THE NEW EMERGENCY.

3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL EMPHASISES THAT PART OF THE COMMISSIONER
GENERAL'S REPORT WHICH HIGHLIGHTS THE LACK OF FUNDS IN UNRWA
AND APPEALS TO ALL GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE URGENTLY WHATEVER
CONTRIBUTIONS THEY CAN TO MEET THE NEW EMERGENCY REFUGEE SITUATION
NOW FACING THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN AND UNRWA.

F.O. PASS TEL AVIV 45, AMMAN 35 AND SAVING TO CAIRO 2, BEIRUT 5
AND JERUSALEM 3.
LORD CARADON.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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2



Mr. *W. [unclear]* Jan 29th
BRITISH EMBASSY, *Amman*
AMMAN.

26 February 1968

[Handwritten initials]

E18/19

(18/2)

Dear Daly,

Refugees in Jordan

Please refer to the Ambassador's letter 18/2 of 19 February to Moore (not to all).

2. Even before the Israeli attack of 15 February a spontaneous movement of refugees from the UNRWA camps in the valley to the higher ground away from the front line had been discerned. The heavy fighting on 15 February both accelerated and intensified the movement both because the refugees were frightened by the shelling and because they feared that the attack and recent bellicose statements by Israeli leaders were the prelude to a further Israeli attack involving an actual crossing of the river Jordan by ground forces. Those who have now left the valley include almost all the refugees (i.e. both the 55,000 post 1967 refugees and most of the 23,000 inhabitants of Karameh village, 1948 refugees) and a number of inhabitants of East Bank valley villages, including some non-Palestinians. By 18 February the exodus from the valley was virtually complete.

3. Although both UNRWA and the Jordan government had half expected to have to move some at least of the refugees out of the valley when the better weather came, they had not allowed for or considered it possible that the refugees would be capable of a spontaneous movement on this scale. Thousands of refugees who had pleaded destitution and inability to cope with tents and transport proved quite capable almost overnight of dismantling tents, packing their belongings and organizing (and paying for) transport, which included private taxis and buses, out of the valley. Farmers with tractors made small fortunes hauling the refugees and their belongings in trailers normally used for agricultural produce.

4. Once up in the hills some refugees found their way to the old camp sites which they had occupied before they were moved down to the valley in preparation for winter and pitched their tents there. But the majority drifted into Amman, where they either went to ground with friends and relatives (who are, incidentally, becoming increasingly disenchanted with their unwelcome guests) or pitched their tents either in the refugee areas or on vacant (and very valuable) land on the outskirts of the city.

5. The Ministerial committee for refugees (the government body officially responsible) on 18 February promised UNRWA to let them know where they planned to put the refugees but the decision was soon taken out of their hands by the Public Security Authorities, who considered that the security risk, particularly in the present political circumstances, presented by these new arrivals was too great to delay action. They therefore selected a new site, known as Ain al-Pasha,

/in the

M. F. Daly Esq.,
Eastern Department.

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in the sheltered valley below Swaileh to the north of Amman on government land earmarked for a new prison. By 20 February those who had pitched their tents in Amman had been removed, often roughly, to this new site and the police made it clear that their intention was to steer all the new arrivals out of Amman, if necessary to this new camp. Faced by this fait accompli UNRWA have agreed to take responsibility for this new camp and are moving their equipment and staff up from the valley; so are the voluntary agencies, including the Save the Children Fund. A sufficient number of refugees had, however, found their way to the old camp sites at Suf (Jerash) and Zizia (an Iranian Red Lion camp south of Amman on the Aqaba road) for these two camps to be reactivated, although neither is really ready to receive the refugees. The former refugee population of the valley is now therefore divided between three camps: Ain al-Pasha, Suf and Zizia; in addition there are those who have drifted to the villages around Irbid in the north and Madaba to the south and those who are still with their long suffering relations and friends in Amman.

6. The official government attitude to this movement as expressed in press announcements has not been particularly honest, since they have declared that the whole thing was planned (patently untrue) "now that winter is over". An earlier plan to establish a camp in the Irbid area has been abandoned.

7. As for the refugees themselves, they should be better away from the Jordan river line provided the weather holds. The last few days have been much warmer and, if it lasts, there should not be too much hardship. But winter is seldom over by March in Jordan and last year the heaviest snow was right at the end of that month, and there is still a need for more tents.

Yours ever,

(J. A. Fortescue)

Copied to Chanceries at Beirut, Tel Aviv, Washington, UKMIS New York,
UKMIS Geneva, H.M. Consulate-General at Jerusalem and JIG Cyprus.

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(14)

Mr. Doherty, Mr. 7/2
Mr. Davies, Jan.
R. J. D. ...



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

(18/2)

5 February 1968

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P.A.
D.O.
N.W.

Jean John,

Refugees

Refugees and displaced persons in the UNRWA camps in the valley have refused to receive their February rations, which should be distributed now, because they object to UNRWA's request that the head of each family, or bona fide other adult member, when he comes to collect rations, should produce some identification. The purpose of this is to cut out middlemen merchants (who over the years have been conniving at inflating the ration rolls) and thus make sure that rations are delivered only to bona fide refugees and D.P.s. There was no question at this stage of reducing the number of rations issued to families. The UNRWA representative here tells me that this has gone ahead since last June without trouble in the towns and in all the camps except Karameh (which is a permanent East Bank camp with 1948 refugees).

2. The Karameh camp inhabitants had objected in January and had gone round the other camps telling the people in them not to take their February rations. UNRWA had tried to persuade the camp inhabitants that they were not proposing to take anybody's rations away, but merely asking for proof of identity by the head of the family.
3. The refugees had been told of the UNRWA proposal, so far as the camps were concerned, in mid January. UNRWA had met objections then about the possible reduction in numbers of ration cardholders through death, or departure from Jordan, by offering to register in place of anyone not present a child from that family or the family of a near relative. UNRWA explain that there are about 200,000 children in Jordan who receive "services" - medical attention etc. - but do not draw rations. These are "balanced" by about 200,000 people drawing rations, who are not entitled to do so either because they are dead or absent from Jordan.
4. The only camp in the valley accepting rations at the moment is Ghor al Kabad, containing Gaza refugees. Michelmores is due in Amman on 7 February to discuss this problem with the King and we will let you know what arrangements are made following this meeting.


Yours ever, Peter [Signature]

(J. P. Tripp)

J. C. Moberly Esq.,
Eastern Department.

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Arab refugees. 1968. MS Refugee Records from the Offices of the United Kingdom, 1947-1970 FCO 17/126. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Refugees, Relief, and Resettlement, link.gale.com/apps/doc/IFBIDA196766969/RRRW?u=omni&sid=bookmark-RRRW&pg=1. Accessed 6 Apr. 2024.